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Abstract
Research into improving the safety of healthcare systems has recently focused on
learning how incidents of harm to patients happen and how to prevent them. Although
it is acknowledged that low participation in incident-reporting systems contributes to the
problem of poor error prevention, little research has focused on improving participation.
This research is focused on how both participation in and use of incident-reporting systems
can be improved by examining the usability of the reporting tools. A large private hospital in
the northeastern United States and the incident reporting app used there were examined as a
case study. A mixed-methods approach using Critical Decision Method interviews, heuristic
usability tests, and surveys was used. Seemingly minor usability issues like inconvenient and
hard to read menus were found to inhibit both the quantity and quality of incident reports.
Additionally, despite the organization having a generally strong safety culture, there were
organizational obstacles to the reporting of incidents and the adoption of useful interventions
in response to incidents beyond what is normally encompassed by the term “safety culture”.
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Introduction
Beginning in 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academies of
Science released a series consisting of reports, To Err is Human, Crossing the Quality
Chasm, and Patient Safety, collectively called the “Quality Chasm series”, detailing the
state of patient safety in the American healthcare system and recommending benchmarks
and procedures to improve the system. A major focus of these and other improvement e!orts
has been reducing “adverse events”, a broad term encompassing any harm to patients that
does not result from the patient’s condition (La Pietra, Calligaris, Molendini, Quattrin, &
Brusaferro, 2005). Adverse events due to human error are of particular interest to those
who study the healthcare system, since they suggest the possibility of improving healthcare
quality by eliminating or compensating for errors through policy changes. The origin in
human error means these adverse events are presumably preventable.
Adverse events include the more urgent subcategory “sentinel events”, defined by
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations as instances of death,
permanent harm, or temporary but life-threatening harm to patients (Joint Commission,
2016)1. Along with these, there are also “near misses”, errors which could reasonably have
resulted in adverse events but whose e!ects were averted. Adverse events and near misses
together make up what the IOM (1999, p. 101) calls “potential errors” and which are more
commonly referred to in the current research literature as “incidents”. Incidents provide a
large pool of information that may be tracked and learned from, but the IOM’s repeated
recommendations to track and learn from these incidents (IOM, 1999, 2001, 2004) often go
unfulfilled and are plagued by incomplete data.
The data that exist on the topic suggest frequent di"culty in detecting incidents.
About half of adverse events that occurred during one study on complications from surgery
were preventable (Healey, Shackford, Osler, Rogers, & Burns, 2002). In the case of medi-
1This is the o!cial regulatory definition of a sentinel event, but it is worth noting that this may not
match how all healthcare organizations use that term. The Joint Commission does allow some flexibility
in how its policies are implemented, and has previously instructed organizations to modify the definition of
a sentinel event for their own internal purposes, as long as such definitions still cover deaths and serious
injuries (Joint Commission, 2011).
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cation errors, a type of incident that is particularly di"cult to detect except in retrospect,
manual and computerized reviews of medical charts found 617 “adverse drug events”, only
27 of which had been reported at the time by sta! (Jha et al., 1998). Those adverse events
which are reported are estimated to represent, at best, half of the adverse events that
actually occur (Barach & Small, 2000).
The further goals of explaining and predicting incidents do not fare well either. A
study comparing di!erent methods of predicting and explaining adverse events for 1,395
patients who underwent a risky surgery at 15 facilities in 4 countries concluded that root
cause analyses (RCAs) failed to find explanations for 24.8% of the resulting deaths, and
none of the various systems for predicting future complications which were applied at time of
surgery successfully predicted more than 21.7% of the deaths (Vollmer et al., 2011). Even
the prediction method that made the largest number of accurate predictions, POSSUM,
seems to su!er from a di!erent problem, a bias towards producing a large number of false
alarms, since it also predicted death for 17.6% of patients who did not die during the period
examined. Such inaccurate predictions imply either faulty models or a lack of detailed and
accurate information from which to make predictions about patients’ future well-being. A
recent review by Marchon and Mendes (2014) of the patient safety literature as it pertains to
primary care turned up similarly troubling results: studies in a number of di!erent countries
identified a lack of communication of “lessons learned” from past incidents, as well as vast
di!erences in practices from facility to facility making policy change recommendations very
di"cult.
If this is representative of the state of human error analysis in modern medicine,
researchers must study and improve the way incidents are assessed and analyzed. One
potential improvement to incident reporting is to track not only adverse events but also the
much larger population of near misses. Research in other high-risk industries suggests that
the circumstances surrounding near-misses are not substantially di!erent from those that
cause actual harm (IOM, 2004). This observation means that a failure to know about near-
misses is an especially worrisome situation for an organization to be in. An organization
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analyzing the circumstances around near-misses would naturally have access to a much
larger data set with which to understand the circumstances that can lead to harm than
is one which only analyzes the particular set of circumstances that led to any one adverse
or sentinel event (IOM, 2004). Indeed, Marchon and Mendes (2014) found estimates that
between 41% and 61% of known reported incidents were near misses by some definition,
either not reaching patients at all or reaching patients but not harming them. We have,
then, three types of “incidents” to consider. The categories of incidents and their relative
frequencies are summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The types of incidents.
Studies on the behavior of people who use incident reporting systems (for the purposes
of this study, “systems” are any of the various procedures and tools by which people may
report incidents) suggest that the true number of near misses is even larger than what
Marchon and Mendes (2014) found. One survey of American nurses found that barely
over half of them would make a formal report about an incident that does not harm the
patient, and barely over two thirds would share information about a harmless incident with
colleagues, compared to rates of 89% to 99% for reporting or sharing incidents that caused
various amounts of harm (Throckmorton & Etchegaray, 2007). In Norway, Flaaten and Hevr
(1999) introduced an incident reporting system for an intensive care unit using anonymously-
submitted forms for describing incidents. Although they found that the majority of incidents
reported were near misses, the total number of reports made was so small as to suggest that
there was overall drastic underreporting by sta!. Comparison of incidents reported by sta!
against those detected by observers suggests that there is also a problem of certain types of
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incidents that do not harm patients going unreported because sta! members do not notice
them, or do not recognize them as incidents (Capuzzo et al., 2005). By not emphasizing
near miss reporting, and by not achieving a high enough reporting rate of harmful incidents,
large pools of potentially-useful data are being overlooked by the healthcare system as a
whole.
There has been some progress in reporting near misses in other contexts, and docu-
ments encouraging the inclusion of near misses in incident reporting systems are becoming
common and readily accessible in diverse contexts. Cursory Google searches for terms like
“near miss” and “near miss report” quickly turn up hundreds of thousands of hits, includ-
ing online reporting systems for firefighters, explanatory web pages from several federal and
state government agencies, and construction industry employee training materials. The
prevalence of smartphones has even allowed mobile and convenient systems for reporting
incidents to the relevant authorities, such as Snap Send Solve for reporting Australian pub-
lic works incidents (Outware Mobile, 2013) or ioSweep for companies to keep track of their
own commercial vehicle accidents (ioSweep, 2015). Of course, even the best system is of no
use if it is not adopted; this is why it is important to the improvement of healthcare that
researchers, policy makers, and medical professionals seem to have taken the IOM reports as
a “call to arms” (Barach & Small, 2000, for example). In the five years after the first of the
reports was published, the proportion of many di!erent kinds of patient safety publications
within the medical literature increased, including an increase in original research on patient
safety issues from 23.7 to 40.8 per 100,000, and the most commonly-discussed patient safety
topic became organizational culture rather than malpractice (Stelfox, Palmisani, Scurlock,
Orav, & Bates, 2006).
Using Incident Reporting
Before changes can be made to address incidents with any certainty of success, accu-
rate information must be obtained about the rate and manner in which they occur. In the
words of a brief presented to Congress on the topic, due to inconsistent standards across
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states and unknown response rates, “it is not possible to quantify the number of errors
today and therefore impossible to determine if the goal has been met” in reducing their
occurrence (Bleich, 2005, p. 9). It is certain, however, that not nearly all of the incidents
that do occur are reported. Currently, only 26 states and the District of Columbia have
policies in place to report their adverse events (Joint Commission, 2013), and even those
places with reporting systems do not make full use of them. The New York Patient Occur-
rence Reporting and Tracking System (NYPORTS) requires a variety of adverse events to
be reported to the state within one business day of their occurrence, but there are severe
problems of underreporting throughout the state, especially in New York City (State of New
York Department of Health, 2007; Pear, 2012, January 6). Further, NYPORTS, like the
Joint Commission’s voluntary reporting system (Joint Commission, 2013), mainly tracks
sentinel events, not the large and information-rich selection of near misses or even certain
minor incidents of harm. A summary breakdown of the types of incidents and how they are
(or may be) reported is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Figure 1, expanded to show how the types of incidents relate to the types of
incident reporting systems.
What incident reporting can and cannot do. Information like that gathered
on a voluntary basis by the Joint Commission can only be used to make rough estimates or
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to compile a general ranking of the kinds of incidents that are common, or at least those that
are commonly reported. The Joint Commission’s data also only contains sentinel events,
not incidents in general, and can only provide a limited picture of the types of errors that
are made and how they can be avoided or mitigated even if the sentinel event data were
complete.
However, it may not be necessary to collect reports of all incidents, or even a repre-
sentative sample of them. Strictly speaking, if “incidents” are events due to human error
that cause or could have caused harm to patients as the definitions above suggest, any
time a person in the hospital coughs could be reported as a near-miss of an exposure to a
contagious disease. Such reports would not conceivably contribute to the overarching goal
of improving the safety of the healthcare system, and would instead waste the sta!’s time.
The purpose of research on incident reporting and interventions to improve it should not
necessarily be to draw the incident reporting rate closer to the true rate of all incidents but
to ensure that sta! are willing and able to consistently report those incidents that would
be most useful for reducing patient harm. We should not necessarily expect reports to be
proportionally-distributed throughout all departments or even for reports of a given type
of incident to match the frequency with which that type of incident occurs. However, this
means that it is important to determine whether those incidents that are considered impor-
tant are being reported, and whether those reports are useful for changing procedures to
avoid or mitigate such incidents in the future.
Safety culture: Encouraging reporting. The term “safety culture” encompasses
the attitudes and practices of members of an organization that contribute to avoid or reduce
harm caused by the service provided by understanding and learning from incidents instead of
punishing people for those incidents or merely complying with outside regulations (Milstead,
2005). This contrasts with “blame cultures” that seek to identify and punish specific people
instead of understanding incidents as resulting from situational factors (Waring, 2005), and
is closely related to the idea of “generative cultures” based on cooperation and innovation
(Westrum, 2004). An organization with a weak safety culture will treat employees reporting
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problems as incompetent or out of line, while one with a strong safety culture will treat
them as providing challenging and productive information (Taylor, 2012).
Some regulatory and advisory groups in healthcare have recognized the importance
of a strong safety culture. The IOM (1999) emphasized the value of creating a non-punitive
environment even in the original To Err is Human report. The Commission on Accredita-
tion of Medical Transport Systems regularly surveys its accredited organizations to measure
the current state of their safety cultures (Frazer, 2011), and the Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality (AHRQ), part of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services, conducts a number of regular safety culture surveys specifically tailored for hos-
pitals, medical o"ces, nursing homes, and pharmacies (AHRQ, 2004).
The attitudes described as safety culture correspond to helpful behaviors. Interven-
tions to improve safety culture reduce the rate of observed harm to patients (Timmel et
al., 2010; Braddock et al., 2014). Beyond this, though, safety culture indicators predict
incident reporting rate, especially those relating to teamwork (Erler et al., 2013). Safety
culture at the level of the entire facility appears most closely related to incident reporting,
although the attitudes of the facility, department, and individual are all correlated nega-
tively with incident occurrence rate and positively with incident reporting rate (Kagan &
Barnoy, 2013). It is worth noting that in one of the examples of underreporting of incidents
noted above, only about half of nurses surveyed rated their workplace as having a positive
safety culture (Throckmorton & Etchegaray, 2007), and that only 44% of all respondents
to a major nationwide safety culture survey had made an incident report in the previous
year (Sorra et al., 2014). Therefore, in addition to usability, safety culture both overall
and at the unit level should also be measured and considered when attempting to explain
the hospital’s incident reporting methods and determining how they may be improved. It
is also worth investigating whether the very high proportion of reports made by nurses is
due to particularly lax reporting by other hospital sta! (explainable by di!erences in safety
culture) or to nurses actually observing more incidents due to the nature of their jobs (Busse
& Wright, 2000; Johnson, 2002).
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Usability: Making reporting easy. “Usability” is the extent to which a particu-
lar tool can be used for its intended purpose (ISO, 2010). This is important to consider when
assessing a reporting system because, if the task of writing an incident report is su"ciently
unpleasant, confusing, or di"cult, sta! members could be discouraged or even prevented
from completing those reports. Changes in the design of web forms in other applications
such as surveys and online shopping has increased the rate of completion of those forms by
up to 40% (Wroblewski, 2008). “Usability” refers not only to how easy something is to use,
however, but specifically to how easy it is to use in the intended manner and for the intended
goal. In this case, to be considered “usable”, the form should not only encourage people to
complete it, but also collect the amount and kind of information about an incident that is
needed to implement a response that will make future incidents less frequent or less severe
in the future. In designing a military incident reporting form, Pettersson (2013a) not only
focused on features such as the form’s generality and readbility, but also including prompts
for specific details (e.g., weather conditions, previously-existing issues that influenced the
incident) that are important for truly understanding the incident.
Less obvious but also quite important is that the same principles of usability could
determine whether the information gathered by the system is intelligible to analysts, and
whether it can be shared easily when needed. The full details of Pettersson’s form redesign
process are illuminating for this, as she identified incident reports made using the older,
more open-ended form as being frequently incomplete, and determined through testing of
new form designs that prompts for key details resulted in reports that more often identified
plausible causes and solutions for the incidents in question than reports filed with the
old form had (Pettersson, 2013b). In the hospital setting with which the present study is
concerned, an incident report and its analysis are typically not provided by the same person,
and are certainly not provided at the same time using the same form, but the general idea
remains that certain context must be included in incident reports if a useful solution is to
be found.
The hospital involved in this study uses a reporting app with three interfaces of inter-
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est: one for reporting incidents, one for reviewing the reports and describing the measures
taken to respond to them, and one for viewing aggregate data about the reports that have
been filed. For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to them as the reporting, followup, and
aggregate interfaces, respectively. Aspects of the design of all three of these interfaces could
influence the hospital’s ability to learn from incidents, and in particular, the reporting in-
terface’s design could contribute to the problem of incident underreporting. Designing new
reporting software is outside the scope of the present study, but recommendations to the
hospital or the software delevoper for how they may, respectively, customize or redesign the
interfaces is. Various types of usability guidelines may be applied to the way the reporting
app solicits input to find potential flaws with the design of the system itself that discourage
or prevent incident reporting from proceeding as intended.
Precedents
To understand how safety culture and usability can impact reporting, and to identify
what likely areas for improvement exist at a particular facility or with a particular reporting
tool, consider the successful examples of such systems that already exist.
Successful incident reporting in another industry: NASA ASRS. One
precedent for a successfully-implemented incident reporting system in an industry highly
sensitive to dangerous errors is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). This system
was developed by the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) in response
to a pair of nearly identical incidents on di!erent airlines in 1974, one a near-miss and one
a deadly crash, which could have been avoided had safety information been shared between
the two di!erent airlines involved (Reynard, Billings, Cheaney, & Hardy, 1986). Although
information about the actual administration of ASRS is di"cult to come by (Beaubien &
Baker, 2002), it is at least known that ASRS was designed to collect and store data in
such a way that it may be searched for key information about “any arbitrarily defined topic
related to aviation safety that may arise” while preserving the quality of information that
would be available by accessing the original reports from which the database is constructed
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(Reynard et al., 1986).
ASRS is still improving, and encouragingly, has shown change over time in who
reports incidents. From 2003 to 2012, the proportion of incidents reported by air tra"c
control and cabin crews increased (NASA, 2012). It is hopefully uncontroversial to say
that the very di!erent environments involved would expose reporters with di!erent jobs
to di!erent types of incidents, and that they therefore find problems that would otherwise
go unnoticed. However, it is still not a perfect system. The actual data collection process
consists of voluntary submissions from pilots and other professionals and amateurs involved
in aviation, who report aviation’s equivalents of the types of adverse events and near-misses
(that is, accidents that actually did cause harm to people and incidents that could have but
were somehow averted). Due to this voluntary nature, it is unlikely that ASRS provides
for a representative sample of incidents, but it at least has the capacity to identify the
causes of frequently-reported types of incidents (Reynard et al., 1986). It does not directly
result in regulation, although analysts’ judgements about urgent hazards are forwarded
to appropriate regulatory authorities. Rather, it is credited with improving the safety of
aviation by improving the willingness and ability of its participants themselves to identify
and prevent the circumstances that commonly lead to incidents (Beaubien & Baker, 2002).
Two key features responsible for this are confidentiality and feedback.
Confidentiality in ASRS includes anonymization of the reports themselves and legal
immunity when incidents are neither deliberate nor due to a person being unqualified for
their duty. If it is clear that an incident was not deliberate or due to incompetence, NASA
analysts remove identifying information from reports and release them to the public, making
them practically anonymous (Reynard et al., 1986; Billings, 1998). The o!er of conditional
immunity from prosecution, according to the designer of the system, has resulted in pilots
providing large quantities of information which precisely explain their incidents and show
why they were not at fault (Billings, 1998).
Feedback in ASRS comes mainly in the form of a regular newsletter, Callback2, which
2Callback is freely available to the public at http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback.html
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presents selected incidents and the results of analyses of them. Each issue focuses on
particular themes which are reflected in issue titles, such as “Winter Weather Operations”
(January 2014) or “When Autopilots Go Bad” (October 2012). Incident reporters are also
acknowledged and thanked for their reports in a very specific way, with a letter that includes
a timeframe within which the incident report will be analyzed, and a form for the reporter to
send to NASA to request a description of how their particular report was handled (Reynard
et al., 1986). Studies on feedback interventions in other contexts imply that this is a likely
area for improvement of incident reporting practices. Feedback on how survey results are
used has been found to increase intent to respond to future surveys (Thompson & Surface,
2009) and to attend follow-up events (Hutchinson et al., 2012). Most promisingly, Kluger
and DeNisi (1996) found via a meta-analysis that feedback generally improves motivation
and performance in a variety of tasks.
Current healthcare reporting practices. The American healthcare system lacks
a nationwide reporting and analysis system as large and comprehensive as ASRS, despite
having a variety of limited-use voluntary and statutory systems in use for many years (Leape,
2002) to draw from for inspiration. The recent Partnership for Patients initiative is some-
what of an example, a limited analogue to ASRS used only within the Medicare/Medicaid
system, which has been credited with reducing the number of hospital-acquired conditions
(AHRQ, 2013). However, many tools are available with which healthcare providers can col-
lect data on di!erent indicators of their safety and e"ciency. Billing data may be used to
measure factors like time of stay, which act as indirect measures of the quality of care pro-
vided. Nursing departments may submit data to the National Database of Nursing Quality
Indicators, which records many di!erent types of incidents but only in a nursing context
(Montalvo, 2007). Hospital sta! in general report adverse events and near misses by vari-
ous methods for their internal records as suggested by IOM (1999) and Joint Commission
(2011). The hospital with which the present study is concerned uses all of these methods.
Incidents are reported there through an online reporting application, the records from
which are then used for both internal and external reporting purposes. It is alone among
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the above-mentioned methods in that it identifies both adverse events and near misses, is
used by all departments, and contains details about not just what kinds of incidents occur
but also how they occur. Reporting apps seem very promising as a method of learning from
incidents – but only if they are implemented in such a way that people are both willing
and able to provide the needed information. The present study focuses on the usability and
organizational practices surrounding this app.
Purpose of this Research
The present study examined incident reporting as it is practiced at a large private
hospital in the northeastern United States. The purpose of this research was to determine
whether, and to what extent, the plausible factors reviewed above contribute to the un-
derreporting of important incidents, including both harmful incidents and near misses, and
how well the resulting reports are used to improve patient safety. This information was
then used to advise the hospital on how they can expect to gather more and better incident
reports. This is formalized in the following research questions:
• Question 1: To what extent is underreporting of incidents due to problems in the
organizational procedures surrounding the use of the reporting app?
• Question 2: To what extent is underreporting of incidents due to problems in the
usability of this particular reporting app?
• Question 3: What issues are analysts facing in their use of incident reports to improve
patient safety, and to what extent?
The present study addressed the above questions in three ways. The first two ap-
proaches, semi-structured interviews and usability testing, focused on examples of organi-
zational and usability features of the reporting system. These “depth” methods examined
specific attitudes and decisions related to incident reporting and observations of the report-
ing app to identify specific strengths and weaknesses of the app and the way the organization
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applies it. The last approach, surveys, focused on the experiences of the hospital sta! over-
all. It was a “breadth” method, using questions based on past surveys and the results of the
interview and usability test approaches to determine the commonness and severity of po-
tential problems in the system, for the sake of prioritizing policy changes that this hospital
can take and in order to provide a model for generalizing these results.
Approach 1: Interviews
Method
Participants. Six participants were recruited for in-depth interviews, five regard-
ing normal use of the reporting app and one regarding the analysis and use of aggregate
data. Three participants were recruited via a series of e-mails sent by sta! in the hospital’s
Patient Safety department to specific sta! members they believed would be interested in
participating. Two participants were recruited via contact cards given out at a quality im-
provement event at the hospital. One participant was recruited via e-mail at the suggestion
of a family member of the participant. All participants were asked to recruit others in a
snowball sample, but no additional participants were recruited this way. Of the five partic-
ipants who took part in the interviews about normal use of the reporting app, one was a
nurse manager, two were non-manager nurses, one was a manager in a non-medical position,
and one was a non-manager in a non-medical position. Participants’ ages and genders were
not collected due to concerns that this information could be used to personally identify
them.
Materials and procedure. The interview procedure for the five regular app users
was semi-structured and consisted of three sections. In the first, I asked introductory
questions about job position and whether the participant was responsible for analyzing
submitted incident reports. In the second, I asked an assortment of questions about team-
work and attitudes adapted from various safety culture surveys, along with a small number
of usability-related questions. In the third, I used the Critical Decision Method (CDM), a
tool of Cognitive Task Analysis, as described by Crandall, Klein, and Ho!man (2006) to
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explore specific examples.
Following the lead of Erler et al. (2013), the general safety culture and usability ques-
tions were drawn from, or based on questions found in, established sources: two overlapping
but slightly di!erent safety culture surveys used by regulatory bodies (Commission on Ac-
creditaion of Medical Transport Systems, 2012; AHRQ, 2004), one study that explored the
implementation of a health information exchange system (Feldman, Schooley, & Bhavsar,
2014), and one study that recommended a set of questions for getting explanations of a
proposed system’s user requirements in advance of designing the system (Browne & Rogich,
2001). For analysts, who are regular users of the completed reports others have submit-
ted rather than its input interface, questions were further modified to ask about potential
organizational influence on their analyses rather than on their input.
The CDM (Crandall et al., 2006) consists of identifying an example of the activity
being studied, then asking a series of questions about the details of the decision-making
process used in that example, including whether the participant consulted others for advice,
how long it took to make the decision, and whether the example event the participant
describes is typical or atypical within their work experience. Answers are then verified by
creating a timeline of the event and asking the participant to verify that it is an accurate
description. Some additional questions were drawn from the above-mentioned study on
eliciting user requirements (Browne & Rogich, 2001) and a study on the general usability
of incident reports across industries (Snowdon & Johnson, 1999). Counterfactual questions
are typically also included in the CDM, asking what the participant would have done if
certain key factors had been di!erent, but this line of questioning was omitted. In the
present study, I asked for an example of one time each participant successfully made an
incident report and one time each participant decided not to make a report or aborted a
report in progress.
In all sections, participants were also asked some unscripted followup questions for
clarification and to explore unexpected tangential topics, but for the most part, the in-
terviews followed the scripts prescribed by the safety culture surveys and the CDM. The
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complete set of scripted interview questions is included as Appendix A.
The trend analyst was interviewed using a separate procedure in a substantially less-
structured way about other issues unique to that participant’s job responsibilities, which
still incorporated some of the safety culture and CDM questions when appropriate. The
analyst uniquely asked not to be recorded, so notes were taken throughout the interview.
Results
Factors a!ecting reporting. These factors can be classified broadly as dealing
with usability or organizational culture and practices.
Organizational factors. CDM walkthroughs did not provide as much detail as ex-
pected about the examples they described because participants were very slow to o!er
specific examples and instead typically opted to describe general types of incidents they do
or do not report. When asked for examples of situations in which they chose not to make
reports, participants frequently mentioned problems encountered when making reports on
behalf of others. One participant gave the example of simply forgetting to make a report
requested by someone else, and implied that the person who requested the report could have
made the report instead but was unwilling rather than unable to do so. One participant
gave a very di!erent answer, an example of a problem judged to be not appropriate to
report using the reporting system. In this example, the participant described intervening to
settle a personal dispute involving a member of their unit being rude to another member,
an issue which does not meet the criteria of an incident but which is occasionally reported
anyway (see “Approach 3: Surveys”, below).
When asked for examples of situations in which they chose to make reports, par-
ticipants once again described scenarios in which they entered reports on behalf of others
because the person who committed or witnessed the incident did not have time. Taken with
the above, this suggests that a key di!erence between the reports made and reports not
made on behalf of others is simply a matter of who finds time during a busy workday to
make the report. One participant described a situation in which they made a report that
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another sta! member neglected to make because they judged it to be unimportant. This
example serves as a counterpoint to the above example of declining to report a sta! conflict,
as it described a situation in which someone’s decision that something was a “non-incident”
was incorrect. Such misses, if not picked up by another sta! member as occurred in this
example, are a likely cause of underreporting, especially since the participant indicated that
this was a “very typical” circumstance.
In almost all cases of both types of examples, participants indicated making the deci-
sion to report or not to report quickly, immediately, and with little or no outside guidance.
When guidance was sought, it was to confirm the accuracy of details with those involved in
the incident. Incident reporting, except when reporting on behalf of someone else, appears
to be a very individual process.
Four participants indicated they believed that sta! were afraid of being punished for
their involvement in incidents when the incident reporting system was first introduced. They
said that that fear became less widespread as sta! became used to the reporting process,
but two participants went on to say that they were aware of sta! members who currently
believe anonymous reports are not actually anonymous. Although confidentiality is built
into the reporting app itself because the system never requires incident reporters to identify
themselves, there is at least some fear that reports could contain enough information to
be personally identifiable. One unit manager clarified that this varies from department to
department, because some unit managers’ followups to incidents are very harsh and blame-
centered while others handle incidents more gently. Despite the confidentiality the app
is designed to allow, participants reported having to reassure others that the reports are
supposed to be used for learning rather than punishment. The other unit manager who
participated even reported having to disregard reports that were apparently filed with the
intent of getting specific sta! members in trouble.
Certain issues related to the organization and job responsibilities may interact with
the app in such a way that they create new usability problems that otherwise would not
occur. The above-mentioned problem of unhelpfully vague reports resulting from problems
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that do not meet the definition of “incident” results from the way the organization treats
the reporting system. If a sta! member pauses or is interrupted while writing a report,
they may lose their report due to the app automatically “timing out”. Most often cited
by participants, however, was the problem of sheer time required. Participants from two
units described shortcuts created to reduce the time needed to make reports. Although all
participants in this study completed their example incident reports in less than 7 minutes
(see “Approach 2: Usability Tests”, below) they warned that sta! may take up to 15 minutes
per report, which is prohibitive when it competes with important job responsibilities like
making patient rounds or when sta! typically only have time to report at the end of the
workday rather than immediately upon committing, witnessing, or otherwise learning of
the incident they intend to report. Delaying reports to late in the workday makes it more
likely that important details or entire incidents will be forgotten.
Participants also reported making judgements that particular problems did not qualify
as “incidents” and therefore should not be reported. Some of the specific examples given in
interviews, dirty bathrooms and interpersonal disputes between sta! members, seemed to be
unambiguously correct rejections which should be handled by another method rather than
reported via the incident reporting system. Two participants whose job duties included
transcribing reports filed via time-saving shortcut methods noted that they had decided
to not report non-incidents that other sta! had attempted to report via those shortcuts,
both of which appeared to be correct rejections. If they had not been in the position to
judge those as inappropriate topics for incident reports, those non-incidents would have
been reported. This suggests that, in addition to underreporting, there is a problem of
“false alarms”, that is, non-incidents being reported as incidents. Misses are plausible here
as well, for example if a sta! member mistakenly believed some piece of faulty surgical
equipment to be a low-priority maintenance issue rather than an urgent danger, but none
of the participants provided examples that were clearly their own failures to recognize true
incidents.
The hospital organization also seems to have a strong safety culture, judging by
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participants’ statements that there is much less fear of punishment now than there was
when the reporting app was introduced. One participant who handled reports submitted
through a shortcut method mentioned singling out sta! who made near miss reports in order
to praise them for their “good catches”. Although doing so compromises confidentiality,
positive feedback for participating in the incident reporting system encourages future use.
Usability factors. Although a separate procedure was used to detect usability issues
(see “Approach 2: Usability Tests” below), participants in the structured interview also
reported that either they or their colleagues encountered issues with the app’s usability.
These mostly concerned the reporting app’s drop-down menus. These menus, which are
used for classifying incidents, were described as containing too many options to be used
quickly, including some options which were ambiguous or seemed irrelevant to the particular
category of incident being reported. However, issues with the specifics of the drop-down
menus were not simply a matter of there being “too many” options. One participant
reported that certain types of common incidents were left o! of the menus, and suggested
that the app could be used much more quickly if additional incident categories were added.
One unit manager mentioned an ongoing problem that impacted the usability of the
submitted incident reports. In some incidents involving equipment, reports did not specify
the situation or manner in which equipment was malfunctioning, making it impossible to
know what diagnostics or repairs are needed if the problem is not obvious upon seeing the
equipment. The participant attributed this to a belief among the sta! of the unit that
submitted the report that the equipment was not actually broken but had just been used
incorrectly. Finally, the analyst who took part in the unstructured interview identified one
issue with the usability of the aggregate interface: that selecting the followups made by unit
managers does not consistently include the followups in the generated aggregate reports. It
was not clear whether this issue impeded analysis or was merely irritating.
Factors a!ecting analysis. These factors are broadly concerned with the flow and
use of information about incidents within the hospital. Most are organizational, although
participants reported that two usability issues not addressed above also influenced this
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organizational information flow.
Participants’ descriptions of the reporting process, along with informal conversations
with other hospital sta! members who aided in arranging the present study, were used to
create a flowchart, seen in Figure 3, of the hopital’s incident report cycle. Sta! members
use the reporting interface of the app or the appropriate workarounds to make incident re-
ports. Specialized sta! members called “Quality Coordinators” (QCs) audit the submitted
reports to ensure that they are classified correctly (e.g., that the “level of harm” selected
is consistent with the narrative description of the incident) before forwarding them to the
appropriate unit manager(s) for analysis. Unit managers review the reports, decide appro-
priate responses, implement them, and ask leadership for coordination if the response to
the incident requires the action of multiple units. They then describe their responses using
the app’s followup interface and submit them for record-keeping purposes.
Patient safety analysts use the app’s aggregate interface to obtain “ad hoc reports”,
customizable tables of aggregate data about incidents. These aggregate reports are used
by unit managers, quality coordinators, and administrators to examine the trends in the
occurrence of incidents. Only reports about the frequency of specific incident types deemed
to be high priority are created on a regular basis, but analysts may generate reports as
requested on a wide variety of topics, including any category of incident listed in the re-
porting interface and what, if any, response was made to a given incident. These reports
do not always contain the requested information. The analyst participant reported that
updates to the app are issued, but may change default settings without prior notice, and
that even if the settings are correct, the aggregate interface intermittently fails to export
the descriptions of the followup actions taken.
The time required to make a thorough report was a common theme in the interviews.
Intriguingly, two participants in the structured interview described workarounds already in
place in their units to reduce the time needed to report incidents. In one unit, a hotline
was implemented, so that the person who commits or witnesses an incident may call an
internal phone number and leave a voice message describing the incident. In another, a
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“reporting book”, essentially a notepad of brief forms to fill out, was introduced, which
achieves the same e!ect in a di!erent medium by allowing sta! to write rather than speak
their freeform descriptions. In both workarounds, a designated sta! member (a supervisor
for the hotline, and the unit manager for the book) transcribes the freeform descriptions
into the appropriate box in the reporting interface of the app and enters as much of the
other prompted information as possible from the description available. The participants
who described these workarounds credited them with reducing the average time to report
an incident; in the case of the hotline, the estimated reduction was from 10–15 minutes to
as little as one minute.
Feedback is provided in “group huddles”, meetings between unit managers and their
units where recent incidents are reviewed and unit managers give reminders or introduce
unit-level policy changes when needed, and broad information on trends in certain incident
rates is provided in aggregate reports. However, the unit managers interviewed expressed
di"culty coordinating with other units. When a unit manager’s followup concludes that
multiple units contributed to an incident, it can be di"cult to get the proper policy changes
instituted in all units through the proper organizational channels. Units are also somewhat
isolated in the sense that, if one unit has already solved a particular recurring problem,
other units may not be aware of it and therefore will miss the opportunity to adopt the
same solution. However, like the fear of punishment, this likely varies throughout the
hospital depending on the overall attitudes of and relationships between specific units. One
unit manager participant praised another specific unit for their degree of cooperation.
There is presently no method for providing widespread feedback on participation in
the incident reporting process, and interviewees report di"culty communicating with other
units, both for coordinating with them and learning from them. A newsletter analogous to
the ASRS’sCallback previously existed but was discontinued; as of the end of interview data
collection, a new procedure is currently being set up consisting of short daily meetings of
unit managers to share recent important incidents and followups. Formal records of these
followups, however, are not necessarily available due to an apparent oversight in the design
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of the followup interface: unit managers may submit their forms blank, leaving it unclear
in the report record whether an incident was addressed or, if so, how. This likely is a strong
contributor to the problem of units being unable to learn from each other.
Ancillary findings. Some details about the app and the organization turned up
during interviews that are not clearly classifiable but are still interesting and potentially
relevant to improving the reporting process. One participant o!ered two suggestions for
specific improvements to the process which are not already addressed by the above items.
The participant suggested that the aggregate reports in use should track the rates of the
causes of incidents and that the reporting interface could be improved by adding prompts for
appropriate actions to take in response to the incident type, such as reminding a sta!member
who is accidentally stuck with a needle to go to Employee Health after entering the incident
report. Two participants mentioned that users attempt, erroneously, to use the reporting
app to report ongoing problems such as dirty facilities or faulty alarms. Although certainly
issues worthy of attention that could have safety impacts, they are not considered incidents
because they do not involve specific instances of harm or potential harm to specific patients
or sta!. This seems to be an inevitable e!ect of attempting to report a particular kind of
problem that the system is not designed to handle.
Although they were not asked to, two participants incidentally mentioned the amount
of work experience they had. One participant had only worked at the hospital for about a
year, which raised the possibility that hospital employees may be insu"ciently experienced
using the system or insu"ciently assimilated into the organizational culture. As this is a
potential confound but not directly part of any research question, this question was added
to later data collection (see “Approach 3: Surveys”).
Approach 2: Usability Tests
For the second phase of data collection, I observed natural-like use of three di!erent













Participants. Participants in this portion of the study were four of the six interview
participants, the principal investigator (PI), and the thesis advisor (TA). For assessing the
interface used for creating incident reports, the two nurse non-managers, the nurse manager,
the PI, and the TA participated. The non-medical manager was also asked to participate
in this task, but declined, reporting having never entered a single incident report. The
non-medical non-manager was not asked to participate due to technical di"culties. Two
participants (one unit manager and the analyst) participated in assessment of the followup
interface, and one (the trend analyst) participated in assessment of the aggregate interface.
As in Approach 1, participants’ ages and genders were not collected for privacy.
Materials and procedure. Assessment of the report-creation interface used the
“training module”, which replicates the interface of the fully-functional version in every
way except that no information entered is actually saved as an incident report. Preliminary
testing was performed by the PI exploring the options of the interface unstructured, followed
by a pilot test of the scenario by the TA. All participants including the PI and TA were
presented with the training module on a Dell Latitude D820 laptop computer running
Microsoft Windows 7. All participants other than the PI also received a paper copy of a
narrative describing an incident based on a published case report (Gupta & Cook, 2013).
They were instructed to read the narrative and enter an incident report into the reporting
app as if they had been asked to do so by an overworked colleague.
The incident narrative described a medication error in which a patient is given an
incorrect treatment at first, but the treatment is changed to the correct one with no notice-
able harm done. This scenario was chosen because medication errors are uncontroversially
worthy of reporting, and the choice to present it as if it were a request from a colleague
rather than a first-hand experience was made so that participants employed in non-medical
fields could also perform the task without objecting that it would be implausible for them
to tend to a patient. The incident narrative is included as Appendix B.
Discussions with various authorities in the hospital and with the participant ruled out
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direct access to actual incident reports as examples due to legal and privacy concerns, so the
followup interface was assessed informally without exploring the interface or a natural-like
observation of use via a brief examination of the actual interface and screenshots of it used
by the hospital for training.
The aggregate interface was assessed by asking the participant to arbitrarily choose
items to export in an example aggregate report, so that the normal procedure of selecting
options and using them to generate a spreadsheet could be observed.
For all participants who were interviewed, the usability test immediately followed the
interview, so audio recording for the non-analyst participants and note-taking for the analyst
participant continued from the previous task. Due to the unavailability of satisfactory
screen-capture software (see “Limitations and Recommendations for Future Use of This
Method” below), the think-aloud method (Rubin & Chisnell, 2008, p 204–206) was applied
instead. Participants in the report scenario task were asked to narrate their use of the
reporting app step-by-step and to volunteer any additional comments that came to mind
about the interface or process as they entered their incident reports. Additionally, I took
notes to ensure that behaviors or obstacles not noted aloud by the participants were still
recorded.
The observed interfaces and user behaviors were compared against three sets of guide-
lines: those of Bargas-Avila et al. (2010), Nielsen (1994), and the IOM (2004). Bargas-Avila
and colleagues created a set of domain-specific guidelines intended to address not just gen-
eral usability issues but also the specific problems of filling out forms. Nielsen’s heuristics
somewhat overlap with these, but are more well-established and may be used to detect and
describe problems not anticipated in this specific context. They are comparable to compet-
ing methods in their e!ectiveness (Liljegren, 2006; Hvannberg, Law, & Lárusdóttir, 2007).
Finally, the IOM’s criteria for a good reporting system are used to determine whether the
reporting app includes ways to collect all of the information that is necessary for learning
from incidents, which may be used to evaluate both the existing prompts and the complete
record of the incident report and the organizational response that they are used to obtain.
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Results
Comparisons of the reporting app interfaces to Bargas-Avila and colleagues’ guidelines
are described in Table 1, Nielsen’s in Table 2, and the IOM’s in Table 3. Where violations
were found, or where additional explanation of a specific guideline is necessary, they are
described in greater detail in long form. The incident reporting and followup interfaces were
rated according to compliance with all three sets of guidelines. Because the Bargas-Avila
guidelines only apply to forms to be filled out, the aggregate interface was only rated on
the relevant Nielsen heuristics and IOM guidelines.
Table 1. Reporting App Compliance with Bargas-Avila and Colleagues’ (2010) Guidelines
for Web Forms.
Category Description Violations
Form content Forms should be short and intuitively-ordered, allow flexibil-
ity in answers, and clearly distinguish between required and
optional questions
Yes
Form layout Fields for answers should be labeled above, listed one per
row, and sized appropriately for the length of the answer
No
Input types Menus, checkboxes, buttons, or open response fields are ap-
propriate for di!erent numbers and types of answers. Op-
tions should be in an intuitive order and limited in number
if possible
Yes
Error handling Answers should have their expected formats clearly indicated
and should not be cleared by errors. Error messages should be
polite, informative, embedded in the form, and easily noticed
Yes
Form submission Submission buttons should only be usable once and not be
confusable with “reset” buttons. Submissions and how they
will be used should be confirmed
Yes
Bargas-Avila guideline issues. Violations in four of the five categories were
found. These violation are described in detail below.
Form content-related. One section of the reporting interface form produces a pop-
up window with its own “save” and “close” options separate from the rest of the form,
while others cause additional fields to appear conditionally within the same window. This
inconsistency violates the guideline to keep the form as simple as possible and could distract
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or confuse the user. Although the form allows the user to save and resume making a report at
any stage, the time taken to complete a report may itself discourage the use of the reporting
interface. On the followup interface, despite all fields being marked with the asterisk that
indicates they are mandatory, it is possible to submit a completely blank report.
Input type-related. The reporting interface consists largely of drop-down menus used
for categorizing incidents by unit, severity, type, and so on. Participants had some di"culty
finding the appropriate items both on longer menus and from lists generated by search
boxes. One selected the wrong item from the search results list when trying to describe the
medication error in the scenario, failed to notice this error, and completed the incident report
with the incorrect information still entered. Participants also disagreed on the classification
of the incident in the scenario, with one calling it “wrong treatment or therapy” while the
others called it a “medication event”. Participants even disagreed on whether the incident
should be classified as an actual incident (one participant) or a near miss (all others).
Additional menu problems were detected in the preliminary test, but did not occur
during any of the tests involving the incident scenario. Menus sometimes lack responses
equivalent to “no” or “not applicable” in situations where they would be expected (e.g.,
as a response to “was another area involved?” when indicating the department where the
incident took place). Not all date fields have format templates.
Error handling-related Screenshots of error messages obtained from one of the partic-
ipants indicate that error messages are extremely vague. In one example, an error message
indicated that a report could not be submitted because the user needed to “correct data”
but failed to explain what entered information specifically needed to be changed. Another
error message reviewed not only failed to explain to the user what the problem was, but did
not give an error name or code to be passed on to someone else using the app’s technical
support.
Form submission-related. While it is unclear whether the reporting interface is set up
to prevent accidental multiple submissions of the same report, the unclearness is because it
directs the user almost instantly to a guideline-compliant confirmation screen. The system’s
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response to submission lacks any indication of what, if anything, will be done with the
report.








and the real world
The system should present things in familiar
terms similar to those encountered in other
contexts
Yes
User control and free-
dom





Terms should use consistent and conventional
definitions
Yes
Error prevention The system should be designed to avoid errors
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Error messages should be presented in terms





Help tools should be readily available, search-
able, and explain things step by step
Unclear
Nielsen heuristics issues. Violations of seven of the ten heuristics were found,
with evidence ambiguous about one additional heuristic.
Visibility of system status. When an unsubmitted report is left untouched for ap-
proximately three minutes, the contents of the form are briefly replaced with a hard-to-read
redirection message before returning to its previous state, which may startle or interrupt a
user who is still at the computer but not actively typing.
Match between system and the real world. For the reporting and followup interfaces,
this is addressed by the Bargas-Avila form content guidelines. In addition to the issues listed
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there, the list of possible fields on the aggregate interface is not in an easily-recognizable
order.
User control and freedom. Changing a response to such a question clears responses
to all “downstream” items, e.g., changing the answer to “What is the nature of the event?”
for a medication-related incident will clear all entered medications and doses even though
the same medication information is still relevant for di!erent types of medication incidents.
Consistency and standards. This is addressed by the Bargas-Avila input type guide-
lines.
Error prevention. The reporting app generally provides no confirmation or instruction
to review entered items when the form is saved. In the aggregate interface, certain characters
cannot be copied-and-pasted into text boxes, but the app does not indicate this.
Recognition rather than recall. By definition, the reporting interface’s instruction to
“provide a brief factual narrative” relies on recall. The user answers most questions using
drop-down menus, templates, or search features that suggest possible matches while the
user searches, allowing at least some use of recognition. The followup interface consists
entirely of free response questions, relying entirely on recall over recognition.
Flexibility and e!ciency of use. It was unclear from testing whether the reporting and
followup interfaces had any opportunities for customization or shortcuts. The list of fields
on the aggregate interface is customizable, and may be reordered for easy use, according to
a followup e-mail exchange with the analyst participant.
Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors. This is addressed by the
Bargas-Avila error handling guidelines.
Help and documentation. Other than a single tutorial video which features an
overview, acquiring any help using the system requires non-anonymously accessing a support
center by logging in to it or contacting a person via e-mail or phone.
IOM guideline issues. The total stored data about the incident, including both
the incident report and the record of any followup measures taken, are referred to in Table
3 as the “report record”. Comparison of the information requested by the reporting app
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1. Who discovered/reported the event? (roles, not names) Yes Yes
2. How? Yes Yes
The Event Itself
3. What happened? (Type of event) Yes Yes
4.Where in the care process was it discovered/did it occur? Yes Yes
5. When did the event occur? Yes Yes
6. Who was involved? (functions, not names) Yes Yes




8a. Severity Yes Yes
8b. Preventability No No
8c. Likelihood of recurrence No No
9. Narrative of the event, including contributing factors. Yes Yes
Ancillary Information
10. Product information (blood, devices, drugs, etc. that
were involved).
[1] [1]
11. Patient information (age, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis,
procedures, and comorbid conditions)
[2] [2]
Detailed Causal Analysis (if deemed necessary)
12. Technical, organizational, and human factors associated
with the Eindhoven model (RCA).
NA [3]
13. Recovery factors that can occur at each point for near
misses.
NA No
14. Corrective actions that were taken to recover from the
incident.
NA No
15. Patient outcome as a result of the corrective actions
taken.
NA No
16. Whether a similar case has recently been investigated. NA Yes
Lessons Learned NA No
Notes: [1] Depends on the indicated type of incident and/or answer to “was any equip-
ment involved?” [2] Identifying the patient by name and medical record number is
mandatory, so this information can be retrieved if thought relevant. [3] Root Cause
Analyses (RCAs) are only conducted for sentinel events, which are outside the scope of
this study. See Deeter and Rantanen (2012) for a discussion of RCA as it is ap-
plied in this particular hospital and comparison to a possible alternate analysis method.
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against the IOM’s guidelines for a good incident reporting system revealed compliance with
the vast majority of the relevant features. Items labeled “no” in the table are those for which
the reporting app lacks a specific prompt for the user to provide the type of information
described by the guideline. Items labeled “NA” are those that are not concerned with
the original incident report and would therefore not be expected to occur in the reporting
interface. It should be cautioned that there are many optional fields on the reporting
interface, and users of the followup interface may even submit a completely blank followup,
so a “complete” report is not guaranteed to contain all of the prompted information, merely
to contain prompts for it. The version of the report displayed in the followup interface
contains all information that was entered by the original reporter, in the same order and
with the same labels (excepting, of course, any changes made by QCs based on the incident
narrative details).
Neither the reporting nor followup interface asks users to rate the preventability or
likelihood of recurrence of an incident as part of their incident report or followup. There are
no required fields in the followup interface, so unit managers also do not need to identify
recovery factors, describe the patient outcome, or even necessarily report what followup
they made to the incident. As long as the incident report is properly labeled by the original
reporter, however, the aggregate interface may be used to determine whether similar inci-
dents have recently been reported and addressed by generating a table of whatever criteria
are of interest.
Ancillary findings. Although not strictly part of any of the above usability guide-
lines, the reporting app also has some additional worrisome features. The app is web-based
and only compatible with certain specific versions of Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE),
which may seriously limit software compatibility as support for older browsers is gradu-
ally dropped. This proved to be a problem when setting up the laptop that was used for
usability testing, as the appropriate version of IE had to be manually installed and the
automatic update feature of Microsoft Windows had to be manually turned o! to avoid
automatically downloading and reinstalling a newer, incompatible version of IE. In most of
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the usability tests, the app loaded quickly and without serious problems, but during one
test, the simple act of accessing the app took about two minutes. The participant for that
test confirmed that such delays are common. This implies that some unknown issue(s) with
the app, the browser, or the internet service at the hospital is/are artificially extending the
time required to report each incident.
Approach 3: Surveys
Although the interviews and usability tests identified a number of likely obstacles
and a few genuine benefits in the current system, their very small sample size means they
cannot be relied upon to determine how common issues are, and may have missed other
issues completely. For the third phase of data collection, I administered two hospital-wide
surveys to judge the frequency of the various obstacles and helpful features identified in the
previous approaches, as well as to answer questions that the previous approaches raised or
left unanswered.
Method
Participants. The hospital’s Chief Medical O"cer recruited 198 participants via
an e-mail drafted by the authors. Participants were sta! members of the hospital involved
in the above approaches and a second, smaller hospital in the region owned by the same
parent company. We expected that participants would indicate which of the two hospitals
they worked at using the “primary unit or work area” field, but very few did. However,
because both hospitals use the same incident-reporting app and are part of the same larger
administrative structure, we did not attempt to separate data by facility.
Of the original 198 participants, 142 (72%) indicated that they did not analyze inci-
dents, and were directed to the “user version” of the survey and the remaining 56 (28%)
indicated that they did, and were directed to the “analyst version” of the survey. For clarity
and brevity, user version participants are called “UPs” and analyst version users are called
“APs” below. Nineteen UPs and 2 APs declined to answer any further questions after the
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demographics, and were excluded from analysis. UPs who answered some questions but not
others were excluded from analysis on the specific questions they did not answer. One AP
indicated in the free response questions that they did not actually review submitted incident
reports; this AP’s answers to two of the free response questions (asking for an example of an
underreported incident type and for “any other comments about incident reporting”) were
coded and included below in the analysts’ free response answers, but this participant was
excluded from analysis on all other questions. This yielded a total of 123 UPs and 53 APs
who gave valid responses to some or all of the multiple choice questions. Valid responses to
free response questions varied, and are described individually in “Results”, below.
Breakdowns of participants’ responses to the demographic questions are found in
Tables 4, and 5. APs had a median of 13 years of experience at the hospital (range: 0.08 –
37 years), while UPs had a median of 8.5 years of experience (range: 0.42 – 41 years). As
in Approaches 1 and 2, participants’ ages and genders were not collected for privacy.
Table 4. Participant Demographics: Role.
Role Number in Number in Total (% of
User Survey Analyst Survey All Participants)
(% of UPs) (% of APs)
Manager of a Medical Unit 1 (< 1%) 13 (24%) 14 (7.9%)
Manager of a Non-Medical Unit 0 (0%) 2 (3.8%) 2 (1.1%)
Nurse 118 (96%) 28 (52%) 146 (82%)
Physician 1 (< 1%) 8 (15%) 9 (5.1%)
Other Medical Role 1 (< 1%) 1 (1.9%) 2 (1.1%)
Other Non-Medical Role 1 (< 1%) 0 (0%) 1 (< 1%)
Other Unclassified Role* 1 (< 1%) 1 (1.9%) 2 (1.1%)
No Answer 0 (0%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (< 1%)
*Self-reported roles that are di"cult to classify into the other categories.
Materials and procedure. Results from the observation and interviews were used,
along with other likely problems predicted based on the successes of ASRS and on the safety
culture surveys and usability guidelines cited above, to generate questions for online surveys.
Pilot testing with five students in a graduate Research Methods class was used to revise
the phrasing of certain questions to be more easily understood. Participants were asked
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Table 5. Participant Demographics: Incident Reporting Frequency.
Incidents Reported in the Number in Number in Total (% of
Previous Year User Survey Analyst Survey All Participants)
(% of UPs) (% of APs)
0 11 (8.9%) 10 (19%) 21 (12%)
1–2 43 (35%) 15 (28%) 58 (33%)
3–5 37 (30%) 7 (13%) 44 (25%)
6–10 15 (12%) 14 (26%) 29 (16%)
11–20 11 (8.9%) 6 (11%) 17 (9.6%)
21 or more 6 (4.9%) 2 (3.7%) 8 (4.5%)
first about their job categories and work units (as was the case in the interviews), then
about their years of work experience and frequency of use of the reporting app. They
then indicated whether or not they analyzed/followed up on incidents that others reported.
If they said they did, they were directed to the analyst version of the survey. If they
said they did not, they were directed to the regular user version. Participants took the
survey via an online survey tool called “Clipboard” developed and hosted by RIT. The
specific questions used in each version were di!erent as appropriate to the context, but
each version consisted of two blocks of Likert-type scale questions and a small number
of followup free response questions. Questions were ordered so that those considered less
personal or potentially embarrassing were presented first, in accordance with survey design
recommendations around “objectionable questions” (Dillman, 2000, p 73–77). The complete
survey questions are included as Appendix C.
In the first block of each survey, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which
they agreed with various statements using 5-point Likert-type scales anchored at all points
with “strongly disagree”, “somewhat disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “somewhat
agree”, and “strongly agree”, then to provide specific examples of the types of situations
being asked about (e.g., to provide an example of a category of incident they would like
to see added to the drop-down menus). In the second block, they were asked to indicate
the frequency with which specific types of events occurred while they were trying to report
or analyze an incident. These also used 5-point Likert-type scales, with the anchors being
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“never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, “often”, and “always”.
Results
Free response questions. Free response questions to surveys were analyzed by
grouping conceptually-similar answers together to create codes, then grouping those coded
answers together into categories. Most free response questions asked for specific examples
or improvement ideas, and so were coded simply by summarizing the specific example or
improvement o!ered by the participant. The other questions asked for “any additional
comments”. Note that the number of responses falling into a particular category do not
necessarily sum to the number of usable answers for that category, as some participants
touched on multiple topics in their answers, and that the numbers of participants who
chose to answer each question are quite di!erent.
UPs were asked for examples of confusing incident classification categories and cat-
egories that would be helpful to have but are currently not included on menus. When
asked about confusing incident classifications, 11 of the 61 UPs who answered the question
suggested simplifications, including 5 who said it was di"cult to find the appropriate items
on menus and 4 who suggested that the app should be made entirely free-response. Nine
said that it was not always possible to determine the level of harm to a patient. Similarly,
9 said they were unsure of the meanings of specific options, including 3 who had di"culty
understanding the levels of harm to patients and 5 who said terms used in the app were
generally hard to understand or poorly-defined. The most common response for confusing
incident classifications, given by 26 UPs, was that particular options were missing; however,
half of such answers did not give a specific example, and no specific type of incident that
should be added to the menus was mentioned by more than three UPs.
When asked specifically about missing menu options, 11 of 38 UPs gave responses
which included at least one specific item they would like to see added. This yielded 20
specific option suggestions, each mentioned by exactly one UP, and 7 general categories of
missing options, only one of which (skin issues) was mentioned by more than one UP. Ten
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UPs said they could not think of a specific problem, and 4 simply said “see above” because
they had already answered this question in their response to the previous question. One UP
suggested making more room for users to enter “other” responses, seemingly anticipating
the large variety of other responses.
APs were asked for examples of problems they could not fix due to underreporting,
confusing classifications in reports they receive, and reports that did not contain enough
information to address the incidents described. As above, there were many unique responses
and therefore little confidence in what constituted an ongoing problem. When asked about
underreporting, 4 of 17 APs gave examples of specific types of incidents, 4 gave problems
in patient record-keeping, and 5 gave problems in general information flow throughout the
hospital. The remaining answers dealt with general quality issues that do not qualify as
incidents, or did not give a relevant example at all.
When asked about confusing classifications in reports, responses were even more scat-
tered. Out of 13 APs who answered, only 9 gave specific examples. Their answers covered
12 di!erent issues, only one of which was identified by more than one AP: 3 APs answered
that reports were being sent to the wrong people for followup.
When asked about missing information in reports, 10 of 19 APs identified specific
missing information, including 8 who said the free response narratives to describe incidents
were too short, missing numerous details. Nine APs indicated having to seek additional
information about incidents in order to decide how to address them, including 6 who con-
sulted patient charts and 6 who asked for additional explanation directly from the sta!
involved in the incidents. One AP specifically singled out their unit’s reporting shortcut as
the cause of the un-detailed reports.
UPs’ and APs’ responses to “any other comments?” included many specific sugges-
tions for improving the app (17 of 40 UPs, 9 of 20 APs) or organization (24 UPs, 6 APs),
but these suggestions were, again, widely scattered and those suggestions given by more
than one participant were often reiterations of their responses to earlier questions (both free
response and rating scale questions), such as indicating that reporting was time-consuming
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(5 UPs and 2 APs, as well as 6 UPs who cited high workload taking precedence over report-
ing). The other most common responses were that the system is used punitively or in some
way results in fear or resentment (10 UPs, 2 APs), complaints about a lack of feedback on
how reports are used (5 UPs, 5 APs), calls to shorten or simplify tedious aspects of the form
(4 UPs, 4 APs), some form of praise for shortcut reporting methods either already in place
or that the participant believes should be introduced (3 UPs, 2 APs), and that near-miss
reporting should be encouraged more (4 UPs).
Pre-analysis for rating scale questions: Demographic trends. Demographics
were not considered when coding and categorizing free responses. However, they were
considered prior to analyzing the rating scale (agreement and frequency) questions because
they could serve as explanations or confounds for particular trends.
Unsurprisingly, years of experience at the hospital and years of experience in health-
care overall were fairly highly correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.656 for the analyst survey, r =
0.633 for the user survey, both ps < 0.001). To avoid confusion due to covariation, and
because years of experience at the hospital was conceptually more relevant to questions
about the hospital’s organizational culture, only years of experience at the hospital were
included in the further analyses. Consequently, references to “experience” below refer to
years of experience at the hospital.
For each survey version, role and experience were examined as possible predictors of
reporting rate, using PLUM method ordinal regressions with role as the factor, experience
as the covariate, and number of reports in the past year as the DV. Among APs, nurses
filed fewer incident reports in the past year than did participants in other roles, odds ratio
0.120 compared to non-nurses (95% CI 0.026 to 0.553), Wald !2 = 7.395, p = 0.007. Other
roles and years of experience did not appear related to number of reports filed for either
APs or UPs, all Wald !2 < 1.9, all ps > 0.2.
Participants came from a very large number of units, with a very small number of
participants working in each unit, so participant unit was not included in statistical tests
due to the high risk of false positive results. Instead, the only survey responses examined
INCIDENT REPORTING 37
on the level of individual units were those from the units identified using the free response
answers as likely locations of endemic problems. Almost all of the reports of punitive use in
the free responses came from three closely-related units representing one specialty. Although
only one AP singled out the shortcut in use in their unit as a cause of missing information
in narratives, it is important to check the other responses from that unit to determine
whether this is a plausible cause of problems there because, despite support among sta! for
the existing shortcuts and the introduction of more, there is good reason from the literature
to think they do not work as well as other methods because the lack of prompts would
result in frequent omission of helpful information.
Rating scale questions. Some of the user survey items (e.g., “I tend to report
as much as I can, even if it means making some reports that aren’t really necessary”)
were ambiguous as to whether they indicated helpful or harmful conditions. For these
items, answers indicating agreement were coded as negative and disagreement as positive
because the purpose of all such questions was to gauge the prevalence of potential sources of
inappropriate reports and underreporting identified in the interview phase. I then proceeded
to create a way to rank these items by the approximate strength of this disagreement.
Likert scale responses are, strictly speaking, ordinal data, so although the following data
transformation is reasonable because ordinal attitude data consistently seems to behave
very much like linear interval data (Norman, 2010), I caution that this approach is only
used here, and should only be used, to generally determine whether participants’ attitudes
were positive or negative and to rank overall attitudes in order of their relative strengths,
not to assign precise numerical values to the absolute strengths of those attitudes.
To determine the highest-priority issues, responses were recoded according to valence,
so that frequency and agreement data can be compared directly by interpreting them as
indicators of the presence or absence of particular problems or helpful features. For all
items rated on level of agreement with the item, answers of “neither agree nor disagree”
were excluded as being di"cult to interpret and other answers were recoded according to
whether they indicated a harmful condition (“negative”) or a helpful condition (“positive”).
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For example, the answer “agree” would be coded as positive in response to the item “my unit
is good at avoiding mistakes” but as negative in response to the item “using the reporting
app is tedious”. Similarly, for items rated on the frequency of the item, answers that
indicated a helpful condition occuring more often than not were coded “positive” and those
that indicated a harmful condition occurring at least as often as not were coded “negative”.
That is, the middle option of “sometimes” was coded as negative because it indicated that
a positive condition occurred no more than half the time. The extreme answers, “always”,
“never”, “strongly agree”, and “strongly disagree”, were weighted as twice as important as
others in order to generate an approximate measure, valence, of how strongly participants
felt a problem was present or absent.
For items that were possibly related to the unit-specific issues identified above, a score
of “net valence” was constructed. This allowed the valences of all responses by participants
in the unit(s) in question to be compared to determine whether participants overall agreed
that those issues were present, as well as to find possible causes of them. Net valence V
was calculated as:
V = (2VP + P ) ! (N + 2VN )
where VP = the number of answers coded “very positive”, P = number coded “positive”,
N = number coded “negative”, and VN = number coded “very negative”.
The units reporting punitive use of the system were examined first. For most of the
relevant items (e.g., “mistakes lead to positive change”, “I get positive feedback when I follow
safety procedures”), V ranged from 2 to -2, with most individual participants’ scores either
neutral or weakly positive, indicating that sta! attitudes towards their supervisors and
general confidence in the system is not seriously lacking. The remaining items examined all
had V " -3. This included two items asking about punitiveness and one about anonymity,
showing a general trend towards distrusting the way the system is applied.
The unit that used a shortcut reporting method was then assessed the same way, with
responses that might be relevant to the question of scored for net valence. Although UPs
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indicated on three di!erent measures that they were rushed for time (V " -5) and often
handled incidents without reporting them (V = -11), they seemed satisfied with the speed
of the shortcut reporting method (V = 1). APs, however, indicated that they were not
receiving enough reports (V = -8) and that the reports they did receive tended to not have
enough detail (V = -3).
Net valence may be a helpful tool for comparing similar numbers of responses, but
for samples with large di!erences in size, it can be very misleading based on wildly unequal
numbers of responses to di!erent questions. Therefore, in order to rank all rating scale
questions by how urgently UPs believe they could be improved, all rating scale responses
were standardized based on valence and number of responses as follows:
U = 2VN + N2 (VP + P + N + VN )
yielding a general rating of perceived urgency, U, which is the weighted proportion of neg-
ative responses. This makeshift “urgency index” is theoretically able to range from 0 (if
nobody believed it was a problem) to 1 (if everyone believed it was a severe problem).
Table 6. Risk Matrix Used for Prioritization.
Severity Urgency Index:
" 0.09 0.10–0.24 0.25–0.49 # 0.50




This index was then used along with the criteria put forward by Cook and Herout
(2015) for ranking usability problems by severity. Problems are ranked “Serious”, “Mod-
erate”, “Minor”, or “Not Applicable” according to the e!ect of a usability problem on use
of the tool being assessed. “Serious” problems are those which cause a user to abandon a
task or render the task impossible. “Moderate” problems are those which cause setbacks or
delays that are not severe enough to prevent use, but which may make the user so dissat-
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Some types or details of incidents are not included on
[the app]’s drop-down menus, but should be.
0.53 Moderate High
The way [the app] asks me to classify incidents is
confusing.
0.52 Moderate High
My incident reports get ruined by [the app] having an
error or crashing.
0.10 Serious High
I give up on reporting a particular incident because
of [the app] having an error or crashing.
0.10 Serious High
I wish my unit had a faster way of reporting incidents. 0.50 Minor Medium
Using [the app] is tedious. 0.44 Moderate Medium
If something goes wrong with [the app], I can easily
find out how to fix it or work around it.
0.44 Moderate Medium
When I use [the app], I have trouble finding the items
I need on menus.
0.40 Minor Medium
Anonymous reports aren’t really anonymous. 0.23 Moderate Medium
[The app] asks me for information I am not comfort-
able providing.
0.07 Moderate Low
isfied that they avoid using the tool. “Minor” problems are those which cause a task to be
irritating, confusing, or ine"cient but which do not prevent the task from being completed
or lead users to stop using the tool. Some items clearly mapped to severity levels, such
as “I give up on reporting a particular incident because of [the app] having an error or
crashing,” which falls in the serious category because it entails the app encountering an
error or crashing, one of the possible criteria that can lead a problem to be rated serious.
For those questions that were more ambiguous, severity was determined with the aid of
comments made in the interview and free response answers to clarify whether encounter-
ing particular problems can result in particular relevant consequences, like users avoiding
the app entirely. Although these severity criteria are intended for assessment of usability
features of software, they are phrased in such a way that they may be generalized to apply
to safety culture features that a!ect willingness and ability to make incident reports. Since
each question in the survey measures the prevalence of a problem, no items were coded as
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There are certain things I am sure are problems, but
I can’t fix them because they don’t get reported.
0.38 Serious High
I don’t get enough information in incident reports to
figure out how to respond to them.
0.27 Serious High
My analyses get ruined by [the app] having an error
or crashing.
0.10 Serious High
Using [the app] is tedious. 0.41 Moderate Medium
If something goes wrong with [the app], I can easily
find out how to fix it or work around it.
0.38 Moderate Medium
When I use [the app], I have trouble finding the items
I need on menus.
0.41 Minor Medium
I get confused by the way incidents are classified in
the reports I receive.
0.29 Minor Medium
People are making too many reports about things
that don’t really count as “incidents”.
0.14 Moderate Medium
Incident reports are phrased like the reporter is hiding
something.
0.14 Moderate Medium
I give up on analyzing an incident report because of
[the app] having an error or crashing.
0.09 Serious Medium
People are making too many reports about things
that are not in my power to fix.
0.06 Minor Low
“Not Applicable”.
Problem rankings and usability index scores were then used to create a risk matrix,
which allows for each problem to be coded as high, medium, or low-priority for the hospital
or software developer to address. The risk matrix is shown in Table 6, and the survey items
with their urgency, severity, and overall priority scores in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10. Usability
issues were the most likely to be classified as high priority. This may be attributed to the
overall positive scores participants gave to most aspects of hospital safety culture, except
for those related to punitive use of the system. In addition to being rare, safety culture
problems also tended to be ranked as less severe because few of them would lead directly to
the user being unable to complete a task. Time pressure and tradeo!s between reporting or
analysis and other tasks, which are broader organizational issues not necessarily indicative
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I get interrupted while making an incident report and
end up losing the report.
0.19 Serious High
If I made more reports, I would not have time to do
other important parts of my job.
0.48 Moderate Medium
I feel like I have to rush through work. 0.43 Moderate Medium
I try to address incidents without reporting them by
talking directly with whomever was involved.
0.31 Moderate Medium
When we change how we do something in response to
an incident, the change makes sense to me.
0.26 Minor Medium
People make incident reports to try to get each other
in trouble.
0.19 Moderate Medium
I tend to focus on the incidents I think are most im-
portant, even if it means not reporting some other
incidents.
0.18 Moderate Medium
I get positive feedback when I follow safety proce-
dures.
0.17 Moderate Medium
My mistakes are held against me. 0.12 Moderate Medium
I tend to report as much as I can, even if it means
making some reports that aren’t really necessary.
0.08 Minor Low
I am comfortable reporting incidents. 0.06 Moderate Low
If nobody has addressed an ongoing problem, I will
make sure to report it the next time it happens to try
to get someone to fix it.
0.05 Moderate Low
My supervisor/manager responds helpfully to sugges-
tions for how to improve safety.
0.05 Moderate Low
Mistakes lead to positive change. 0.04 Moderate Low
My unit is good at avoiding mistakes. 0.03 Minor Low
It’s helpful to report near misses. 0.02 Moderate Low
of safety culture problems, were classified as medium priority for both UPs and APs.
General Discussion
Answering Research Question 1
To what extent is underreporting of incidents due to problems in the usability of this
particular reporting app?
The particular reporting app in use here is promising, but has some serious flaws that
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I wish I knew more about how other departments are
addressing incidents.
0.57 Moderate High
When another department solves a problem my de-
partment is also having, I can easily find out about it
and try using their solution.
0.53 Moderate High
I can come up with ways to address incidents that
make similar incidents less common or less harmful.
0.30 Serious High
I get interrupted during incident report analyses, and
end up not finishing them
0.22 Serious High
If an incident is due to problems in more than one
department, I can get everyone to make the necessary
changes.
0.46 Moderate Medium
I feel like I have to rush through work. 0.36 Moderate Medium
If I made more thorough analyses, I would not have
time to do other important parts of my job.
0.28 Moderate Medium
People make incident reports to try to get each other
in trouble.
0.23 Minor Low
My unit is good at avoiding mistakes. 0.04 Minor Low
Mistakes lead to positive change. 0.03 Moderate Low
My supervisor/manager responds helpfully to sugges-
tions for how to improve safety.
0.03 Moderate Low
It’s helpful to report near misses. 0.01 Moderate Low
are likely the largest obstacles to reporting in this hospital. Survey results confirmed that
usability issues were the most severe impediments to making incident reports. Problems
related to menus and error handling were the most notable.
Consistently throughout all stages of this study, participants encountered problems
with navigating drop-down menus. These menus are customizable, meaning that the content
and arrangement options is within the hospital’s power to improve, but the way menus
are currently customized is a serious issue. In usability testing, they found it di"cult to
find appropriate menu items to describe incidents, both because appropriate items were
not always present and because the menus themselves were long and hard to navigate.
Interview and survey answers bore this out, with the two most urgent high-priority problems
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by far being a lack of useful menu options and complaints that existing menu options are
confusing. These may not prevent reports from being made, but they certainly discourage
reports from being made by making the system so confusing and inconvenient that users
may avoid reporting in the future. However, there was no consensus about how the menus
should be changed, even to the point that participants disagreed on whether there should
be more or fewer options.
Although much less common than menu-related issues (no related problems occurred
in usability testing), error handling was also a common theme throughout the interviews
and surveys. The app occasionally encounters software errors that ruin reports in progress,
and uninformative error messages occasionally leave users unable to figure out why a report
can not be submitted. The result is the loss of a small number of incident reports, but
a problem that prevents reporting entirely rather than merely impeding it still should be
taken seriously. Although this did not come up in interviews or surveys, this problem could
be exacerbated by the fact that little technical support help is available without contacting
the makers of the software non-anonymously.
Answering Research Question 2
To what extent is underreporting of incidents due to problems in the organizational
procedures surrounding the use of the reporting app?
Overall, the safety culture of the hospital seems to be quite sound. With the excep-
tion of some questions about punitiveness, which received a rating of “medium priority”,
participants had very few doubts that the system was, in principle, a good idea or that it
could help improve patient safety. Other hospitals seeking to learn from this case study
should take into account that sta!members’ positive attitudes towards their coworkers and
the practice of incident reporting do not guarantee that they are actually able to make
reports, and other features of the workplace have to be taken into account when planning
policies for incident reporting.
As suggested by the interview results, survey results support the ideas that safety
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culture varies by unit and that punitive use is generally uncommon. The specific cases of
punitive use mentioned by participants in the survey suggest a problem of distrust between
coworkers, and may explain the two most negatively-rated items on the survey among
members of those units, “I try to address incidents without reporting them by talking
directly with whomever was involved” and “I don’t get enough information in incident
reports to figure out how to respond to them”, because fear of punishment is expected to
lead to less use of the incident reporting system.
The issue of addressing incidents without reporting them, however, may also be caused
by time pressure. The unit investigated more closely to examine its shortcut reporting
method still has shortcut and task tradeo! problems despite the presence of a satisfying
shortcut. UPs consider their reporting system adequate but handle incidents informally
while APs receive insu"cient incident reports and insu"cient details in the reports they
do receive, suggesting that attempting to further reduce the time needed to report will not
help boost reporting rate, but that reducing or managing other drivers of workload might3.
It is also worth considering that the shortcut itself, although making the reporting process
more convenient, also makes the reports themselves less detailed, which is discussed in more
detail below (see “Expanding and improving the use of time-saving shortcuts”).
Organizational problems that were not necessarily related to safety culture per se
were the highest-priority in this category. The only problem rated high-priority dealt with
interruptions, and other than punitiveness and feedback, all medium-priority issues also
appeared to be related to finding the time to make reports, through explicitly mentioning
it or hinting at it through informal incident handling and judgement calls about which
incidents are most important.
Answering Research Question 3
What issues are analysts facing in their use of incident reports to improve patient
safety, and to what extent?
3For more information on workload in the same hospital discussed in this study, see Umansky (2016),
Workload in nursing. (Unpublished Master’s thesis) Rochester Institute of Technology.
INCIDENT REPORTING 46
APs faced several of the same usability issues that UPs did, and rated them as
similarly urgent. Unlike UPs, APs encountered usability obstacles in the data provided
to them rather than only in the format and content of the reporting app. APs’ responses
throughout all stages of this study have agreed that incidents reports can often not be
analyzed because they simply do not contain the necessary information. The survey results
in particular showed that, with the exception of rare but severe software glitches, the APs’
most pressing usability problems were related to a lack of information received from incident
reports. This is an interesting and unusual type of usability problem to have, because it
cannot be remedied directly by altering the format of the report or the user interface, but
instead must be remedied by correcting the organizational and interface problems that led
to the omission of useful information from the reports in the first place.
Although not as explicitly clear, the various categorization issues suggest an interrater
reliability problem. UPs reported confusion about which category labels were the most
appropriate descriptions for various incidents, including disagreement about how to classify
the example scenario itself, which was expected to be labeled uncontroversially as a “near
miss of a medication error”. This not only further supports the usability problem of bad
menu options mentioned above under “Answering Research Question 1”, but also directly
leads to a usability problem for the analysts. APs reported finding the categorization of
incidents confusing in the reports they received, which may, along with the general lack
of information, explain the high degree of uncertainty analysts reported about their own
ability to determine useful responses to incidents. In both of these cases, it is reasonable to
say that analysts’ problems can be addressed incidentally by addressing users’ problems.
Interview participants voiced concerns that reports were being filed about inappropri-
ate topics, or that they were being misdirected. The implication of this was that analysts’
time was being wasted by having to reject or redirect a large number of “false alarm” in-
cident reports. Survey results, however, suggest that rather than being common, this may
just be an occasional problem that analysts find particularly annoying but not particularly
troublesome. The failures in the incident reporting process that hinder analysis appear to
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be much more due to misses than to false alarms.
On the organizational side, APs were (perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of
their jobs) again similar to UPs in believing that learning from mistakes was useful, posi-
tive, and often successful. However, a higher proportion of their organizational issues were
high priority than UPs’ organizational issues were4, and the issues they had in common
with UPs were rated as much less urgent by analysts. Instead, APs’ organizational issues
tended to be those dealing with the structure of the organization itself and the procedures
in place. They encountered unique challenges in interpreting and communicating reports,
especially in coordinating di!erent departments to reform their procedures together, and a
lack of easy access to others’ solutions to similar problems. The latter problem in particular
is reminiscent of the problems that prompted the creation of ASRS and Partnership for
Patients. This should serve as a “take-away message” that those seeking to improve the
healthcare system should think about solutions on the scale of individual facilities in addi-
tion to state-, nation-, or industry-wide solutions, because the individual organization may
experience internal small-scale versions of the same problems that are present industry-wide.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Use of This Method
Interviews
Although recommended as part of the CDM, the interview procedure did not include
counterfactual scenarios. It is possible that this caused me to overlook unusual problems
present in the organization or system by virtue of not asking the right questions. Future
researchers and human factors professionals attempting to use CDM in this context should
come prepared to o!er counterfactuals, although such questions are admittedly di"cult to
generate beforehand. Perhaps it would be useful to identify example incidents reported or
witnessed but not reported to discuss in advance, then to create alternative scenarios to
explore based on them, or to (as Crandall, Klein, and Ho!man suggest themselves) conduct
4This includes a common doubt (U = 0.30) that APs had about their own abilities to address incidents
constructively, which seems to contradict that confidence in learning from mistakes.
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the interview over multiple sessions to extract more information. However, either of these
should be done with care to avoid prompting participants about what kinds of answers they
“should” give. Although retelling an event can be reasonably expected to elicit more details
(Nadel, Campbell, & Ryan, 2007), doing so with particular goals and contexts in mind will
tend to alter the memory of the event itself, leading to those extra details being biased or
embellished (Tversky & Marsh, 2000; Mazzoni & Vannucci, 2007, e.g.). Another approach
could be to recruit others who have experience at the specific task being studied to assist in
conducting the CDM interviews, which might also add the comfort of a peer being present,
where an outside interviewer might make the participant uncomfortable and self-censoring.
Usability Tests
Due to di"culty recruiting and scheduling participants, evaluation of the reporting
interface was based on the experience of only five users total, including two who did not work
for the hospital (myself and my advisor), and evaluation of the aggregate interface was based
on only one user’s experience. Due to privacy and legal concerns, the followup interface was
only evaluated based on training screenshots rather than actual use, essentially making it
not only analysis of a single user but a cursory and unrepresentative analysis at that. It
is likely that there are many usability issues that were not detected by this study, either
because they were simply not noticed or because the correct condition needed to trigger a
particular problem was not met. Keeping in mind that this was, strictly speaking, a user test
using heuristics as the method for classifying problems rather than a heuristic evaluation
per se, we can look to the model by Tan, Liu, and Bishu (2009) based on di!erent methods
of evaluating websites. This model would suggest that only about 10% of the followup and
aggregate interfaces’ problems and about 35% of the reporting interface’s problems were
detected. Applying the more generous claims made by Nielsen (1994), this method would
have been su"cient to identify 29% of followup and aggregate interface problems and 75%
of reporting interface problems. In either case, the surveys verified which of those that
were detected were common problems and allowed participants to volunteer any overlooked
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problems they recalled encountering in the past.
An alternate method for increasing the proportion of usability problems found would
be to use a di!erent method of recording the data. Initially, I had intended to record
the usability tests using screen capture software specifically designed for usability testing;
however, the only product that could be located and purchased in time for the scheduled
tests did not function as promised (notably, it was a trial version which only recorded
about a quarter of the screen area, and the registration code provided at purchase failed
to “unlock” the full version of the software) and repeated requests to the manufacturer for
technical assistance yielded no help other than a download link for a di!erent trial version
of the same software, which also did not work. Therefore, data on topics like the number
of clicks needed to perform a task or precisely how long it took users to find desired menu
options were not recorded. I strongly encourage future researchers and designers of incident-
reporting software to explore it with other usability testing methods, especially in light of
the interview results indicating a common dissatisfaction with the time requirements and
confusing menu items of the reporting interface. Design changes to the menus that reduce
the number of steps required to classify incidents would likely reduce both time requirements
and confusion.
Additionally, lacking the opportunity to directly test the incident followup interface
means there may be other usability problems unique to that interface which were not evi-
dent. Certainly, screenshots used for training purposes would be unlikely to include error
messages, for example. However, it is assumed for the purpose of this analysis that, because
all three interfaces are di!erent “modes” of the same piece of software, it is likely that they
share similar issues with error handling, error prevention, and visibility of system status.
Future studies on the usability of incident reporting systems should include a sample com-
plete incident so that realistic followups may be created and entered in the same manner




The surveys did not gather a large enough number of responses to examine all roles
or units thoroughly, and as we recruited participants through intermediaries, we did not
collect the total number of people contacted to participate and could not calculate response
rates.
One question outside of the scope of this study which may be interesting to future
researchers or patient safety professionals is that of priorities. Interviews raised the sugges-
tions that a large enough proportion of incident reports are false positives (inappropriate
reports, such as those that cover topics that are not technically incidents) or misses (failures
to report important topics). For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that failure to
report true incidents was potentially dangerous while reporting non-incidents was merely
inconvenient, hence the former being rated “Serious” severity while the latter was rated
“Moderate”, but the very concept of usability gives us reason to expect that inconvenience
is enough to impede learning from past incidents. The results of this survey suggest that en-
tire missing categories of incidents and entire categories of false positives are both relatively
minor problems, but still do not answer the question of which of these attitudes, if either,
is preferable in general. Certainly, reporting of a large number of important incidents is
ideal, but if an organization must choose between false alarms and misses, which situation
would be more favorable to learning from incidents?
Conclusions: Specific Recommendations for Improvement of the Reporting
App and Organization
Recommendation 1: Revising reporting interface menu options
Interviews and usability testing provided evidence that reporting interface menus
contain confusing items that impact interrater reliability and such a large total number
of items that navigation is di"cult. It seems obvious that the path to addressing this
is to examine users’ suggestions for better menu options, but there are serious obstacles
and constraints to this approach. Legal or accreditation issues preclude altering the menu
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options too much, as it would impair the hospital’s ability to report accurate statistics
to regulatory bodies and quality tracking projects like NDNQI, the Joint Commission’s
reporting system, and NYPORTS. A review of the information required by those bodies
would produce a list of “necessary menu items”, and others may be combined, split, or
renamed as appropriate.
However, the survey data suggest that there is no consensus among sta! about what
additional menu options would actually be helpful for their reporting, and adding all of
the options suggested would likely overall reduce reporting, considering that about half of
UPs (52.46%) and APs (47.17%) already said the app was tedious, and a large majority of
UPs (77.78%) said they at least sometimes have di"culty finding the existing menu items.
Adding additional items may not make navigation more di"cult. Indeed, there is very little
di!erence in the time needed to locate the fifth or the hundredth item on a drop-down
menu as long as the contents of the menu are familiar (Cheng & Patterson, 2002; Fischer
& Schwan, 2008). However, adding items based on only a single request is a questionable
use of the time and e!ort of those who can revise the menus. It may be better to follow
the lead of the one survey participant who called for more opportunities to o!er answers
of “other”, or perhaps even to give users the explicit option to leave the classification of
incidents to the quality coordinators if they cannot decide themselves how to classify them.
If altering existing menu options for clarity is chosen as a means for improving, per-
haps it would be useful to create a reference chart of “translations” between internally-used
categories and regulatorily-required ones. In one variation on this idea, users could use
such a chart to look up what the o"cial category label is for the type of incident they are
trying to describe. Alternatively, the menu options themselves could be changed so that
users could describe incidents on their own terms, and the charts would be used by patient
safety analysts and quality coordinators to convert internal reports to a format intelligible
to regulatory and other outside organizations. Either of these options, however, entails
not only additional time to report or reclassify incidents, but a particularly tedious kind
of additional work. A more modest alternative, then, is to examine the common types of
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changes already being made by quality coordinators and creating a reference chart of rules
for distinguishing between the most commonly-confused labels.
Given the importance of time constraints as a source of underreporting, I recommend
adopting approaches that seem least likely to increase the time needed to make reports.
First, to gather potential new options, introduce an “other” option where one is not cur-
rently available, review the reports marked “other” for common trends, and add new menu
options that adequately describe the common types of “other” reports. Second, to aid
users in distinguishing between confusing categories (i.e., those categories which are most
frequently erroneously chosen and changed by quality coordinators), track quality coordina-
tors’ changes to categorization of incoming incident reports, determine the most confusing
categories, and create a reference chart with rules for distinguishing between them. Group-
ing together the most commonly-used items at the top of each menu may additionally be
helpful for reducing the number of users who cannot find appropriate items, and will likely
have little practical e!ect on time demands (Omanson, Miller, & Joseph, 2014), but users
will require some time to adapt to the new format and will likely have a temporarily higher
error rate as they learn the new format, so the menu should not be changed frequently to
avoid user confusion.
A final option, which would be directed at the developer of the app as a consideration
for future versions of the app rather than at those hospital sta! empowered to customize
the app already in use, would be a change to the menu layout itself. Given that some of
the drop-down menus contain a very large number of items, an alphabetized grid like that
used by Cheng and Patterson (2002) would be a welcome improvement. Such a menu setup
would make the task of scanning a long list of items easy and eliminate the potentially
annoying need to scroll down a long single column.
Recommendation 2: Investigating and remedying punitive use
Overall, punitive use scored near the middle of the priority rankings, but it stood
out as an unusual exception to a general trend of positive safety culture, and especially so
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because it was concentrated in units engaged in a particular specialty. Not only because it
is corrosive to a positive work environment and discourages reporting, but also because it
encourages poor-quality reporting and therefore hinders attempts to improve, allegations of
punitive use should be examined seriously and carefully by the hospital administration.
Punitive use of the reporting system may be considered a form of workplace aggres-
sion, and people who engage in this kind of behavior are somewhat more likely to have a host
of psychological factors such as highly negative attitudes about others’ perceived advantages
and poor “political skills”, the ability to use one’s influence to further organizational goals
(Harris, Harvey, & Booth, 2010). In this case, a possible method for correction could be to
consistently respond to misuses of the system with reminders (directed at the entire unit,
not the individual, or else the anonymity of the reporting system would be compromised)
about the importance of responsible reporting, focusing on the fact that punitive reports
can erode safety and other long-term goals of the organization by eroding cooperation and
information-sharing.
If, on the other hand, punitive use doesn’t seem to consist of targeted acts of re-
taliation but is more like ordinary incivility rather than like aggression, there is another
avenue for improvement. While workplace aggression is apparently due to a mixture of
interpersonal conflicts and predispositions for confrontational behavior, incivility may not
even be intentionally directed at anyone in particular. Especially since sta! in the a!ected
departments already reported generally positive opinions of their supervisors, supervisors
can step in to improve sta! morale by reminding them that they are valued and cared
for. Although this approach is unlikely to prevent punitive use, it could at least provide
sta! with the additional encouragement needed to prevent the victims of punitive use from
becoming unproductive or quitting (Sakurai, 2011).
Recommendation 3: Expanding and improving the use of time-saving shortcuts
Users and analysts alike identified time constraints, trade-o!s, and interruptions as
important discouragements or barriers to using the incident reporting app. Ideally, such a
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problem would be remedied by setting aside time during the workday for reporting, but this
intervention would be best implemented by hiring additional sta! to reduce the individual’s
workload, which would be expensive, or by extending the workday itself, which would not
only be expensive but on top of it irritating to the sta!. Instead, I recommend that the
hospital examine ways to reduce the time needed to make each individual report.
Although the participants interviewed gave positive reviews of the the shortcuts imple-
mented to reduce time demands, determining whether the shortcuts are actually beneficial
would require comparing the followups done on incidents that were otherwise similar except
for how they were reported – which was not allowed in this study due to legal and privacy
concerns about allowing access to complete incident reports. Hospital sta! who are allowed
to access such information should identify incident reports from the units that use shortcuts
and compare those made with and without shortcuts to determine whether shortcut reports
lack necessary information for following up appropriately as was the case in the freeform
incident report forms examined by Pettersson (2013a, 2013b).
If the shortcut reports are still su"ciently detailed for followup, the existing shortcuts
should remain in place, and other units that have the highest workloads should adopt similar
shortcuts of their own to reduce the time demands of the reporting process. If the shortcut
reports are less detailed in ways that impede followup (as seems likely based on form design
guidelines and Pettersson’s incident report redesign), any existing and future shortcuts
should be revised so that all necessary information is prompted. It is probably safe, for
example, to omit the “incident category” prompt currently present in the reporting interface
from a shortcut form, as it can be easily determined from the details of the narrative, but
omitting details so seemingly simple as the time of the incident or the age of the patient
could lead unit managers to make uninformed, incomplete, or irrelevant decisions based
on mistaken assumptions about the conditions of the particular incident. The hotline in
use in one department is particularly worrisome as far as potential for lost information, as
prompts on a written or computerized form may be revisited at any time or addressed out
of order if needed, while voice prompts cannot.
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Recommendation 4: Improving the flow of information
The flow of information about incidents and the followups to them has some limita-
tions, largely involving a lack of feedback and coordination. At the time of data collection,
little information was available about the newly-introduced feedback system, but it centers
around sharing information about recent incidents directly between unit managers. This
directly remedies analysts’ highest-priority problems, which dealt with learning from others
units’ successful interventions, and a lower-priority problem, making changes multiple units
at once.
Such a system seems highly promising and should be given a chance to work before
any additional changes are made, but it is clear immediately that certain aspects of the
hospital’s information flow are beyond its scope. Unlike a Callback-style newsletter, it
would not provide specific feedback to those who reported incidents or allow for long-term
overviews of how a particular category of incidents has been addressed. This means that,
even if coordination and information-sharing between departments is successful, it will not
necessarily be obvious to ordinary sta! that their incident reports contributed to the success.
A lack of clear examples of how their input helped plausibly explains why users reported
commonly (U = 0.26) not understanding the interventions taken in response to incidents.
In other words, this is currently a system with inconsistent process feedback and low face
validity, which reduces users’ trust that the system is useful for making decisions at all
(de Vries, van den Berg, & Midden, 2015). Another approach is necessary to provide users
with the kind of feedback that makes them feel like they are contributing to a useful project.
The feedback system also seems geared only towards addressing recent and notable
incidents. Though this may be very helpful for new or currently-critical issues, time will tell
how useful it is for infrequent or ongoing ones. In either case, good record-keeping would be
helpful for the overall goal of finding successful ideas and spreading them quickly. Analysts
should be required to enter descriptions of their responses to incidents into the reporting
app’s followup interface not for their own future reference for the future reference of anyone
who needs to address a similar incident in the future.
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A newsletter themed around specific topics would fill in the gaps, allowing everyone
from administration to care providers access to information about the way incidents are
being handled and how incident reporting has contributed to it. Flowcharts showing the
proposed improved flow of information may be seen in Figures 4 and 5. I admit uncertainty
about whose responsibility the newsletter should be, but due to their relevant background
knowledge and access to the necessary information, quality coordinators are an obvious
choice. This newsletter can make its point briefly – Callback was originally only a single
page (Reynard et al., 1986, p. 76) and is still only two pages long – and releasing it on a
monthly schedule allows for a longer perspective than the recently-introduced unit manager
meetings seem designed for. The “highlights” of those meetings or appeals to suggest
solutions to unsolved problems could also be included, demonstrating clearly to the typical
user how their incident reports are used.
A final general advisory
Both the hospital with which I worked and any healthcare professionals seeking to
apply the lessons learned here to their own facilities should apply the above proposed
improvements together, not pick and choose among them. Better flow of information is not
useful if the information itself is not useful, and useful reports are not likely when sta! are
too busy, confused, or guarded to make reports that contain all the information analysts
want. Increased sharing of incomplete or misleading information will not improve patient




























































Appendix A: Interview Questions
Notes: In the form used to collect interview data, each set of questions was followed
by blank space for notes, in case the interview was not recorded or information was best
conveyed in a visual format, e.g. a timeline. The last section, labeled “Post-Test”, was
administered after the participant completed the usability test. If the participant did not
participate in that portion of the study, they were asked only the very last question from
that section.
Preliminary
Before we begin, I’d like to ask about your specific job responsibilities in case this is
relevant to how incidents get reported.
Demographics
• What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital?
• What is your job title?
(request further clarification if needed for either of the above)
• How often do you use [the reporting app]?
Part 1
Now I’d like to move on to some questions about how you and your colleagues feel
about incident reporting.
E!ective Use
• Do you think mistakes have led to positive change?
• What does your supervisor or manager do about suggestions to improve safety?
• Is your unit good at avoiding errors?
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• What makes people not want to use [the reporting app]?
FOR ANALYSTS ONLY:
• What do your colleagues want you and the incident reporting system to do for them?
• What do you want out of a good incident reporting system?
Encouragement
• Do people generally support their coworkers here?
• Are you comfortable reporting incidents?
• Do you get positive feedback when you follow safety procedures?
• Do you get informed when incident reports lead to policy changes?
• To what extent does management succeed at getting people to use [the reporting app]?
• What kind of support do people need to report incidents, and from whom?
• What feedback do people need from the system to use it e!ectively?
Punishment
• Do sta! feel like their mistakes are held against them?
• Does it feel like the problem or the person is being reported?
• What information does [the reporting app] require that might make someone not want
to use it?
Time Pressure
• Do you feel expected to do too much too quickly to have time for incident reporting?
• What might people not be able to do anymore if they made more incident reports?
Part 2a
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Now let’s move on to a specific case. I want to know about your experience with this.
Selection
• Give me an example of a time you’ve decided not to report an incident.
If needed, clarify that this can mean:
• avoiding or cancelling a report
• an incident committed or just observed
• a near miss or actual harm (but not a sentinel event)
• unreported for absolutely any reason
Timeline
• Ask what led to the decision to avoid or cancel the report.
• Ask for additional decisions and arrange chronologically.
• Confirm that timeline is accurate.
Deepening
• Confirm how typical/atypical these decisions were.
• Confirm how typical/atypical these circumstances were.
• How long did it take you to make this decision?
• Did you get any guidance or advice about this? Why?
• What other possible responses did you consider? How did you go about choosing not
to report?
• Did you get any guidance or advice about this? Why?
• What other goals were competing with this? What was most important to you at the
time?
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Again, don’t forget to ask for clarification as needed!
Part 2b
Let’s try a di!erent example.
Selection
• Give me an example of a time you have reported an incident.
Timeline
• Ask what led to the decision to make the report.
• Ask for additional decisions and arrange chronologically.
• Confirm that timeline is accurate.
Deepening
• Confirm how typical/atypical these decisions were.
• Confirm how typical/atypical these circumstances were.
• How long did it take you to make this decision?
• Did you get any guidance or advice about this? Why?
• What other possible responses did you consider? How did you go about choosing to
report?
• Did you get any guidance or advice about this? Why?
• What other goals were competing with this? What was most important to you at the
time?
Again, don’t forget to ask for clarification as needed!
Post-Test
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• Do you feel like this reflects reasonably well how you would make a real incident
report?
• What, if anything, is di!erent? esp. scenario details & time to complete task
• Can you think of any other problems using [the reporting app] you’ve run into that
didn’t happen just now?
Is there anything else you’d like to say or ask about the reporting process or this
study?
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Appendix B: Usability Test Scenario
Please read the following narrative carefully. Then, using the [reporting
app] training module, please create an incident report about it. Feel free to
narrate your thoughts about the process of using [the reporting app] as you
work, and to compare this scenario to actual incidents you experienced or
know about if any examples come to mind.
Recently, due to increased workload from a flu outbreak, outside sta! have been
brought in and existing sta! have been shu#ed around. This has led to a number of “near
misses” and minor incidents where patients could have been harmed seriously because sta!
aren’t fully trained in [the hospital]’s safety procedures or used to the department in which
they are currently working. You overhear some coworkers talking about the problems
they’ve run into.
One of them, a nurse, explains a recent scenario that could have been very dangerous
if she hadn’t noticed and fixed it. A few days ago, a 56-year-old man was admitted to the
hospital with nausea and severe pain in his abdomen. It turned out he had been drinking
heavily. He was diagnosed with alcohol-induced pancreatitis and has been in the ICU for
several days. While he has been here, he has su!ered serious complications, including
failure of other organs.
As part of his treatment, he needed to have a saline solution infused directly
into an artery. However, it appears that the last nurse who changed the bag before
your coworker’s shift attached the wrong one. Because of similar labels on di!er-
ent bags of fluids, they had attached a bag containing a solution of both 0.9% sodium
chloride and 5% glucose instead of the bag of only sodium chloride solution that was needed.
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Luckily, when it was your coworker’s turn to check up on the patient, she noticed the
mention of glucose on the label for the bag, realized it was the wrong bag, and swapped
it out for a bag of the correct solution. Your coworker says this decision saved the patient
from what could have been additional organ damage and even death, but that she’s too
busy to make the report so you decide to do it yourself based on her description of the
event.
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Appendix C: Survey Questions
Notes: Because this survey was administered online, formatting of the actual survey
was somewhat di"erent from what is included here. The content of all questions, however,
is identical. Questions without options listed and those asking the participant to provide
specific examples were free-response.
Questions asked to all participants
Before main survey:
• Which of these best describes your role at [the hospital]?
! Physician
! Nurse
! Manager of a medical unit
! Other non-management medical role
! Manager of a non-medical unit
! Other non-medical role
! Other (please specify)
• What is your primary unit or work area?
• How long have you worked at [the hospital]?
• How long have you worked in healthcare overall?







! 21 or more




• Do you have any additional comments about incident reporting?
Main Survey: Analysts’ Version
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following.
• My unit is good at avoiding mistakes.
• Mistakes lead to positive change.
• It’s helpful to report near-misses.
• My supervisor/manager responds helpfully to suggestions for how to improve safety.
• People are making too many reports about things that don’t really count as “inci-
dents”.
• People are making too many reports about things that are not in my power to fix.
• I wish I knew more about how other units are addressing incidents.
• If something goes wrong with [the reporting app], I can easily find out how to fix it
or work around it.
• I wish my unit had a faster way of reporting incidents.
• Using [the reporting app] is tedious.
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• I have to do too much too quickly.
• If I made more thorough analyses, I would not have time to do other important parts
of my job.
• There are certain things I am sure are problems, but I can’t fix them because they
don’t get reported.
• Think about the item “there are certain things I am sure are problems, but I can’t
fix them because they don’t get reported” from the list above. If you said “Agree” or
“Strongly Agree”, please provide an example.
Please indicate how commonly or rarely the following things happen.
• When another unit solves a problem my unit is also having, I can easily find out about
it and try using their solution.
• People make incident reports to try to get each other in trouble.
• Incident reports are phrased like the reporter is hiding something.
• When I use [the reporting app], I have trouble finding the items I need on menus.
• My analyses get ruined by [the reporting app] having an error or crashing.
• I get interrupted during incident report analyses and end up not finishing them.
• I can come up with ways to address incidents that make similar incidents less common
or less harmful.
• If an incident is due to problems in more than one unit, I can get everyone to make
the necessary changes.
• I give up on analyzing an incident report because of [the reporting app] having an
error or crashing.
• I get confused by the way incidents are classified in the reports I receive.
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• I don’t get enough information in incident reports to figure out how to respond to
them.
• Think about the item “I get confused by the way incidents are classified in the reports
I receive” from the list above. If this has happened to you, please provide an example.
• Think about the item “I don’t get enough information in incident reports to figure
out how to respond to them” from the list above. If this has happened to you, please
provide an example.
Main Survey: Users’ Version
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following.
• My unit is good at avoiding mistakes.
• Mistakes lead to positive change.
• It’s helpful to report near-misses.
• My supervisor/manager responds helpfully to suggestions for how to improve safety.
• I am comfortable reporting incidents.
• I get positive feedback when I follow safety procedures.
• If nobody has fixed an ongoing problem, I will make sure to report it the next time it
happens to try to get someone to fix it.
• My mistakes are held against me.
• Anonymous reports aren’t really anonymous.
• [the reporting app] asks me for information I am not comfortable providing.
• I tend to report as much as I can, even if it means making some reports that aren’t
really necessary.
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• I tend to focus on the incidents I think are most important, even if it means not
reporting some other incidents.
• If something goes wrong with [the reporting app], I can easily find out how to fix it
or work around it.
• I wish my unit had a faster way of reporting incidents.
• Using [the reporting app] is tedious.
• I have to do too much too quickly.
• If I made more reports, I would not have time to do other important parts of my job.
• The way [the reporting app] asks me to classify incidents is confusing.
• Some common types or details of incidents are not included on [the reporting app]’s
drop-down menus, but should be.
• Think about the item “the way [the reporting app] asks me to classify incidents is
confusing” from the list above. If you said “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”, please provide
an example.
• Think about the item “some types or details of incidents aren’t already included on
[the reporting app]’s drop-down menus, but they are so common they should be” from
the list above. If you said “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”, please provide an example.
Please indicate how commonly or rarely the following things happen.
• When we change how we do something because of an incident, the change makes sense
to me.
• People make incident reports to try to get each other in trouble.
• When I use [the reporting app], I have trouble finding the items I need on menus.
• My incident reports get ruined by [the reporting app] having an error or crashing.
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• I get interrupted while making an incident report and end up losing the report.
• I try to address incidents without reporting them by talking directly with whomever
was involved.
• I give up on reporting a particular incident because of [the reporting app] having an
error or crashing.
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Appendix D: RIT IRB Approval of Project
INCIDENT REPORTING 73
References
AHRQ. (2004). Hospital survey on patient safety. [Data collection instrument].
Rockville, MD. Retrieved from http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality
-patient-safety/patientsafetyculture/index.html
AHRQ. (2013). Interim update on 2013 annual hospital-acquired condition rate and
estimates of cost savings and deaths averted from 2010 to 2013 (Report No. 15-
0011-EF). Retrieved from http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient
-safety/pfp/interimhacrate2013.pdf
Barach, P., & Small, S. (2000). Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: Lessons from
non-medical near miss reporting systems. British Medical Journal, 320 , 759–763.
Bargas-Avila, J., Brenzikofer, O., Roth, S., Tuch, A., Orsini, S., & Opwis, K. (2010). Simple
but crucial user interfaces in the world wide web: Introducing 20 guidelines for usable
web form design. In R. Mátrai (Ed.), User interfaces (pp. 1–10). Rijeka, Croatia:
InTech.
Beaubien, J. M., & Baker, D. P. (2002). A review of selected aviation human factors tax-
onomies, accident/incident reporting systems and data collection tools. International
Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 2 (2), 11–36.
Billings, C. (1998). Incident reporting systems in medicine and experience with the aviation
safety reporting system. In R. Cook, D. Woods, & C. Miller (Eds.), A tale of two
stories: contrasting views of patient safety. Report from a workshop on assembling
the scientific basis for progress on patient safety (pp. 52–61). McLean, VA: National
Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA.
Bleich, S. (2005). Medical errors: five years after the iom report. Issue Brief (Commonwealth
Fund), 830 , 1–15.
Braddock, I., C.H., Szaflarski, N., Forsey, L., Abel, L., Hernandez-Boussard, T., & Morton,
J. (2014). The TRANSFORM patient safety project: A microsystem approach to
improving outcomes on inpatient units. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 4 ,
425–433.
INCIDENT REPORTING 74
Browne, G., & Rogich, M. (2001). An empirical investigation of user requirements elicita-
tion: Comparing the e!ectiveness of prompting techniques. Journal of Management
Information Systems, 17 , 223–249.
Busse, D., & Wright, D. (2000). Classification and analysis of incidents in complex medical
environments. Topics in health information management, 20 (4), 1–11.
Capuzzo, M., Nawfal, I., Campi, M., Valpondi, V., Verri, M., & Alvisi, R. (2005). Reporting
of unintended events in an intensive care unit: Comparison between sta! and observer.
BMC Emergency Medicine, 5 (3). Retrieved from http://www.biomedcentral.com/
1471-227X/5/3
Cheng, H., & Patterson, P. (2002). The grid menu: E"cient and robust selection of menu-
items. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 46th annual
meeting (pp. 1281–1285). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Commission on Accreditaion of Medical Transport Systems. (2012). Safety culture survey.
[survey instrument]. Retrieved from http://www.camts.org/Safety-Culture-Survey
.html
Cook, A., & Herout, J. (2015). Developing a usability ranking system for findings in health
information technology products. In Proceedings of the international symposium on
human factors and ergonomics in health care (Vol. 4, pp. 23–28). Thousand Oaks,
CA: SAGE Publications.
Crandall, B., Klein, G. A., & Ho!man, R. R. (2006). Working minds: A practitioner’s
guide to cognitive task analysis. MIT Press.
Deeter, J., & Rantanen, E. (2012). Human reliability analysis in healthcare. In Proceedings
of the 2012 symposium on human factors and ergonomics in health care: Bridging the
gap (pp. 45–51). SAGE Publications.
de Vries, P., van den Berg, S., & Midden, C. (2015). Assessing technology in the absence
of proof: Trust based on the interplay of others’ opinions and the interaction process.
Human Factors, 57 , 1378–1402.
Dillman, D. (2000). Mail and internet surveys: the tailored design method (2nd ed.). New
INCIDENT REPORTING 75
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Erler, C., Edwards, N. E., Ritchey, S., Pesut, D. J., Sands, L., & Wu, J. (2013). Perceived
patient safety culture in a critical care transport program. Air medical journal, 32 (4),
208–215.
Feldman, S., Schooley, B., & Bhavsar, G. (2014). Health information exchange implemen-
tation: Lessons learned and critical success factors from a case study. JMIR Medical
Informatics, 2 (2), e19.
Fischer, S., & Schwan, S. (2008). Adaptively shortened pull down menus: location knowl-
edge and selection e"ciency. Behaviour Information Technology, 27 , 439–444.
Flaaten, H., & Hevr, O. (1999). Errors in the intensive care unit (ICU): Experiences with
an anonymous registration. Acta Anaesthesiologica Scandinavica, 43 , 614–617.
Frazer, E. (2011). How do we assess safety culture? Air medical journal, 30 (2), 62–63.
Gupta, K., & Cook, T. (2013). Accidental hypoglycaemia caused by an arterial drug flush
error: a case report and contributory causes analysis. Anaesthesia, 68 , 1179–1187.
Harris, K., Harvey, P., & Booth, S. (2010). Who abuses their coworkers? an examination of
personality and situational variables. The Journal of Social Psychology, 150 , 608–627.
Healey, M., Shackford, S., Osler, T., Rogers, F., & Burns, E. (2002). Complications in
surgical patients. Archives of surgery, 137 , 611–618.
Hutchinson, A. M., Batra-Garga, N., Cranley, L., Boström, A., Cummings, G., Norton, P.,
& Estabrooks, C. A. (2012). Feedback reporting of survey data to healthcare aides.
Implement Sci, 7 , 89.
Hvannberg, E., Law, E., & Lárusdóttir, M. (2007). Heuristic evaluation: Comparing ways of
finding and reporting usability problems. Interacting with Computers, 19 , 225–240.
IOM. (1999). To Err is Human: Building a safer health system. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
IOM. (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st century.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
IOM. (2004). Patient safety. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
INCIDENT REPORTING 76
ioSweep. (2015). ioSweep. Retrieved from http://www.iosweep.com/
ISO. (2010). Ergonomics of human-system interaction – part 210: Human-centred design for
interactive systems (ISO 9241-210). Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization
for Standardization.
Jha, A., Kuperman, G., Teich, J., Leape, L., Shea, B., Rittenberg, E., . . . Bates, D. W.
(1998). Identifying adverse drug events: Development of a computer-based monitor
and comparison with chart review and stimulated voluntary report. Journal of the
American Medical Informatics Association, 5 (3), 305–314.
Johnson, C. (2002). Reasons for the failure of incident reporting in the healthcare and rail
industries. In Components of system safety: Proceedings of the 10th safety-critical
systems symposium (pp. 31–57). Springer.
Joint Commission. (2011). Facts about the sentinel event policy.
Joint Commission. (2013). Sentinel event data: General information 1995-2012.
Joint Commission. (2016). Sentinel event policy and procedures. Retrieved from http://
www.jointcommission.org/sentinel_event_policy_and_procedures/
Kagan, I., & Barnoy, S. (2013). Organizational safety culture and medical error reporting
by israeli nurses. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 45 (3), 273–280.
Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996). The e!ects of feedback interventions on performance:
a historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory.
Psychological bulletin, 119 (2), 254.
La Pietra, L., Calligaris, L., Molendini, L., Quattrin, R., & Brusaferro, S. (2005). Medical
errors and clinical risk management: state of the art. Acta Otorhinolaryngologica
Italica, 25 (6), 339.
Leape, L. (2002). Reporting of adverse events. The New England Journal of Medicine,
347 , 1633–1638.
Liljegren, E. (2006). Usability in a medical technology context assessment of methods
for usability evaluation of medical equipment. International Journal of Industrial
Ergonomics, 36 , 345–352.
INCIDENT REPORTING 77
Marchon, S., & Mendes, W. (2014). Patient safety in primary health care: A systematic
review. Cadernos de saúde pública, 30 , 1815–1835.
Mazzoni, G., & Vannucci, M. (2007). Hindsight bias, the misinformation e!ect, and false
autobiographical memories. Social Cognition, 25 (1), 203–220.
Milstead, J. (2005). The culture of safety. Policy, Politics, Nursing Practice, 6 , 51–54.
Montalvo, I. (2007). The National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators®(NDNQI®).
The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing, 12 (3). Retrieved from http://
www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/
OJIN/TableofContents/Volume122007/No3Sept07/NursingQualityIndicators.aspx
Nadel, L., Campbell, J., & Ryan, L. (2007). Autobiographical memory retieval and hip-
pocampal activation as a function of repetition and the passage of time. Neural
Plasticity, Article ID 90472.
NASA. (2012). ASRS Program Briefing 2012 (Tech. Rep.). Washington, DC: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Nielsen, J. (1994). Usability inspection methods. In J. Nielsen & R. Mack (Eds.), (pp.
25–62). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Norman, G. (2010). Likert scales, levels of measurement, and the ‘laws’ of statistics.
Advances in Health Sciences Education, 15 , 625–632.
Omanson, R., Miller, C., & Joseph, S. (2014). E!ects of item grouping on selection e"ciency.
In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 58th annual meeting
(pp. 1526–1530). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Outware Mobile. (2013). Snap send solve. Retrieved from www.snapsendsolve.com
Pear, R. (2012, January 6). Report finds most errors at hospitals unreported. New York
Times, A12.
Pettersson, U. (2013a). A form to collect incident reports: Learning from incidents in
the Swedish armed forces. The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, 11 (2),
150–157.
Pettersson, U. (2013b). Improving incident reports in the Swedish armed forces (Unpub-
INCIDENT REPORTING 78
lished doctoral dissertation). Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
Reynard, W., Billings, C., Cheaney, E., & Hardy, R. (1986). The development of the NASA
aviation safety reporting system (Tech. Rep. No. NASA Reference Publication No.
1114; NASA ASRS Publication No. 60). Mo!ett Field, CA: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Rubin, J., & Chisnell, D. (2008). Handbook of usability testing (Second Edition ed.).
Indianapolis, IN: John Wiley & Sons.
Sakurai, K. (2011). Coworker incivility and incivility targets’ work e"ort and counterpro-
ductive work behaviors: The moderating role of supervisor social support (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH.
Snowdon, P., & Johnson, C. (1999). Results of a preliminary survey into the usability of
accident and incident reports. In M. Bransby & J. Noyes (Eds.), People in control: An
international conference on human interfaces in control rooms, cockpits, and command
centres (pp. 258–262). London, UK: Institution of Electrical Engineers.
Sorra, J., Famolaro, T., Yount, N., Smith, S., Wilson, S., & Liu, H. (2014). Hospital
survey on patient safety culture: 2014 user comparative database report (Tech. Rep.).
Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
State of New York Department of Health. (2007). New York Patient Occurrence Reporting
and Tracking System—NYPORTS—2005, 2006, 2007 Report (Tech. Rep.). Albany,
NY: State of New York Department of Health.
Stelfox, H. T., Palmisani, S., Scurlock, C., Orav, E. J., & Bates, D. W. (2006). The “To
Err is Human” report and the patient safety literature. Quality and Safety in Health
Care, 15 (3), 174–178.
Tan, W., Liu, D., & Bishu, R. (2009). Web evaluation: Heuristic evaluation vs. user testing.
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 39 , 621–627.
Taylor, J. B. (2012). Safety culture: Assessing and changing the behaviour of organisations.
Gower Publishing, Ltd.
Thompson, L. F., & Surface, E. A. (2009). Promoting favorable attitudes toward personnel
INCIDENT REPORTING 79
surveys: The role of follow-up. Military Psychology, 21 (2), 139.
Throckmorton, T., & Etchegaray, J. (2007). Factors a!ecting incident reporting by regis-
tered nurses: The relationship of perceptions of the environment for reporting errors,
knowledge of the Nursing Practice Act, and demographics on intent to report errors.
Journal of PeriAnesthesia Nursing, 22 (6), 400–412.
Timmel, J., Kent, P., Holzmueller, C., Paine, L., Schulick, R., & Pronovost, P. (2010).
Impact of the Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP) on safety culture
in a surgical inpatient unit. The Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient
Safety, 36 (6), 252–260.
Tversky, B., & Marsh, E. (2000). Biased retellings of events yield biased memories. Cognitive
Psychology, 40 , 1–38.
Umansky, J. (2016). Workload in nursing (Unpublished master’s thesis). Rochester Institute
of Technology.
Vollmer, C., Sanchez, N., Gondek, S., McAuli!e, J., Kent, T., Christein, J., . . . The Pan-
creatic Surgery Mortality Study Group (2011). A root-cause analysis of mortality
following major pancreatectomy. Journal of gastrointestinal surgery, 16 , 89–103.
Waring, J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Social
Science Medicine, 60 , 1927–1935.
Westrum, R. (2004). A typology of organisational cultures. Quality and Safety in Health
Care, 13 (Suppl. II), ii22–ii27.
Wroblewski, L. (2008). Web form design: Filling in the blanks. New York, NY: Rosenfeld
Media.
